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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY
Zeynel Harun Aliog˘ulları
PhD Dissertation, January 2015
Supervisor: Prof. Ahmet Alkan
Keywords Refinements of Nash Equilibrium; Random Assignment Problem;
Aggregate Efficieny; R1 Mechanism; Information Acquisition.
This thesis consists of three independent chapters. Each of them represents an
area of my research interests. The first chapter of thesis contributes to the Game
Theory. We propose a complexity measure and an associated refinement based
on the observation that best responses with more variations call for more precise
anticipation. The variations around strategy profiles are measured by considering
the cardinalities of players’ pure strategy best responses when others’ behavior is
perturbed. After showing that the resulting selection method displays desirable
properties, it is employed to deliver a refinement: the tenacious selection of Nash
equilibrium. We prove that it exists; does not have containment relations with per-
fection, properness, persistence and other refinements; and possesses some desirable
features.
The second chapter of this thesis contributes to the random assignment problem
literature. We introduce aggregate efficiency (AE) for random assignments (RA)
by requiring higher expected numbers of agents be assigned to their more preferred
choices. It is shown that the realizations of any aggregate efficient random assign-
ment (AERA) must be an AE permutation matrix. While AE implies ordinally
efficiency, the reverse does not hold. And there is no mechanism treating equals
equally while satisfying weak strategyproofness and AE. But, a new mechanism, the
reservation-1 (R1), is identified and shown to provide an improvement on grounds of
AE over the probabilistic serial mechanism of Bogomolnia et al. (2001). We prove
that R1 is weakly strategyproof, ordinally efficient, and weak envy–free. Moreover,
the characterization of R1 displays that it is the probabilistic serial mechanism
updated by a principle decreed by the Turkish parliament concerning the random
assignment of new doctors.
In the third chapter, we consider a NIRMP matching marketplace consisting
of ordered set of doctors and hospitals, and two-stage Interviewing and Preference
iv
Reporting Game where hospitals acquire information through interviews and sub-
mit contingent rankings to a center enforcing university-optimal matching. In this
setting, we provide a ‘simple’ example in which there exist no pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. Then, we characterize a domain (of doctors’ preferences) where each
hospital’s interview set forms a ‘ladder’.
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O¨ZET
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Danıs¸man: Prof. Ahmet Alkan
Anahtar Kelimeler Nash Dengesi; Rassal Atama Problemi; Toplam Verimlilik;
R1 Mekanizması; Bilgi Edinimi
Bu tez c¸alıs¸ması u¨c¸ bag˘ımsız kısımdan olus¸makta ve bu kısımların her biri bir
aras¸tırma alanıma girmektedir. Birinci kısım Oyun Teorisi’ne katkıda bulunmak-
tadır. Bu kısımda en iyi tepki fonksiyonlarının deg˘is¸kenlig˘ini baz alarak bir komplek-
slik o¨lc¸u¨tu¨ ve bunun u¨zerinden bir Nash dengesi seleksiyonu o¨nermekteyiz. Strateji
profillerinin etrafındaki varyasyon, her oyuncu ic¸in dig˘er oyuncuların davranıs¸ları
deg˘is¸tig˘inde en iyi tepki fonksiyonunun ic¸erdig˘i pu¨r stratejilerin kardinalitesi ile
o¨lc¸u¨lmektedir. Buradan ortaya c¸ıkan sec¸im metodunun istenilen o¨zellikleri sag˘ladıg˘ını
go¨sterdikten sonra, bir Nash dengesi du¨zeltmesi olarak Nash dengesinin direngen
sec¸ilimini sunuyoruz. Sonra ise, her oyun ic¸in var oldug˘unu, dig˘er bilinen Nash den-
gesi du¨zeltmeleri ile herhangi bir mantıksal ic¸erim ilis¸ikisinde olmadıg˘ını go¨steriyor
ve bir dengede aranan bazı o¨zellikleri tas¸ıdıg˘ını go¨steriyoruz.
Bu tezin ikinci kısmı rassal es¸les¸me literatu¨ru¨ne katkıda bulunmaktadır. Ras-
sal Es¸les¸meler (RE) ic¸in kis¸ilerin ilk tercihlerine yerles¸me oranı u¨zerinden hesa-
planan Toplam Verimlilik (TV) kavramını tanıtıyor, herhangi bir toplam verimli
rassal es¸les¸menin gerc¸ekles¸melerinin her birinin TV permutasyon matrisi oldug˘unu
go¨steriyoruz. Sırasal verimlilig˘in TV’yi kapsadıg˘ını fakat tersinin dog˘ru olmadıg˘ını,
es¸itlere es¸it davranıp zayıf manipu¨lasyona-kapalı ve TV bir mekanizmanın var ol-
madıg˘ını go¨steriyor ve yeni bir mekanizma olarak R1 mekanizmasını o¨neriyoruz. Bu
mekanizma yaygın Seri Olasılıksal (SO) (Bogomolnia et al. 2001) mekanizmadan
TV olarak daha iyi rassal es¸les¸meler o¨nermektedir. Bunun yanında R1 zayıf ma-
nipu¨lasyona-kapalı, sırasal verimli ve zayıf kıskanc¸lıktan-muaf bir mekanizmadır.
R1’nın karakterizasyonu ise Tu¨rkiye’de doktor atamalarında kullanılan bir kuralın
SO mekanizmanın karakterizasyonuna uygulanması ile yapılmaktadır.
U¨c¸u¨ncu¨ kısımda, sıralı doktorlar ve hastanelerin oldug˘u bir es¸les¸me marketini
ele alıp, burada hastanelerin doktorlarla yaptıkları mu¨lakatlar ile bilgi elde ettig˘i
iki as¸amalı bir mu¨lakat ve tercih bildirimi oyununu inceliyoruz. Burada tercihler
bir merkeze bildirilmekte ve merkez hastane-optimal es¸les¸meyi uygulamaktadır. Bu
vi
ortamda, basit bir o¨rnekle pu¨r strateji Nash dengesinin olmadıg˘ı durumların varlıg˘ını
go¨steriyor, daha sonra ise hastanelerin mu¨lakatlarının bir ”merdiven o¨zellig˘i” tas¸ıdıg˘ı
doktor tercihleri ku¨mesini karakterize ediyoruz.
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CHAPTER 1
TENACIOUS SELECTION OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM
1.1 Introduction
The concept of Nash equilibrium (henceforth to be abbreviated as NE) is cen-
tral in the theory of games, and as put by Myerson (1978), “it is one of the most
important and elegant ideas in game theory”. On the other hand, Nash’s pointwise
stability may create multiplicity of equilibria some of which do not satisfy local sta-
bility and produce outcomes that can be criticized on grounds of not corresponding
to intuitive notions about how plausible behavior should look like. In order to allevi-
ate these problems, important refinements of NE have been developed: perfection by
Selten (1975), properness by Myerson (1978), and persistence by Kalai and Samet
1984, among others, have been standards in the theory of games.
However, complex equilibrium anticipation may still be needed. The following
game with three players has three NE, s1 = (I, I, I), s2 = (II, II, I), and s3 =
(II, II, II):
3
I II
1\2 I II
I (1, 1, 1) (0, 0, 0)
II (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0)
1\2 I II
I (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0)
II (0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 0)
Only s1 and s2 are perfect and proper as s3 involves a weakly dominated strategy.
The behavior in s2 corresponds to a coordination failure, hence, is undesirable;
and “very specific set of trembles is needed to justify” this equilibrium (Kalai and
Samet 1984): for II to appear in player 1’s perturbed best response, player 1 has
to anticipate that the mistake of player 2 about choosing I instead of II has to be
strictly less than the mistake of player 3 about choosing II instead of I.1 This is a
clear display of the serious requirements imposed on players’ anticipation capacities:
even when every player is making mistakes about his own choices, his assessment
about the magnitudes of others’ mistakes needs to be correct.
1. Considering a perturbation around s2 with s2ε = (ε1I + (1− ε1)II, ε2I + (1−
ε2)II, (1 − ε3)I + ε3II) with εi > 0 for i = 1, 2, 3, one can observe that s2ε is an
ε–perfect equilibrium only if ε3 > ε2 and ε3 > ε1.
1
On the other hand, s1 is more desirable on account of involving less complex
anticipation: every players’ only best response to any one of the others’ strategies
that are sufficiently close and possibly equal to the one given by s1, is as given by
s1. Hence, when the approximation is sufficiently precise, the local behavior of each
player’s best response around s1 does not involve any variations. Then, each player
needs only minimal anticipation capacities. The numbers of actions that appear in
best responses around s2 are given by 2 for player 1, 2 for player 2, and 1 for player
3 even with arbitrarily precise approximation; and these numbers are given by 1 for
player 1, 1 for player 2, and 2 for player 3 when considering s3.
In order to formalize these ideas, the current study proposes the notion of tena-
cious selection: given any strategy profile and any player, we consider the number
of pure strategies that may appear in that player’s best response when others may
choose a strategy vector that is either arbitrarily close or equal to the one specified.
By employing the upper hemi continuity of best responses, we show that this inte-
ger attains a limit, a lower bound greater or equal to one, before the approximation
terms reach zero. We refer to this as the t–index of the given strategy and player,
and the t–index of a strategy profile is a vector of t–indices where each coordinate is
associated with the t–index of the corresponding player of that given strategy pro-
file. Given any set of strategies, one of its elements belongs to its tenacious selection
whenever there is no other element of the same set which has a t–index less than or
equal to and not equal to that of the strategy under consideration.
The method of tenacious selection is a low–cost notion of complexity aversion.
A higher t–index of a given strategy and player implies that player’s optimal plan
of action displays more variations around that strategy, hence, demands more accu-
rate anticipation of others’ behavior. So strategy profiles involving lower t–indices
are more appealing on grounds of complexity aversion.2 The identification of such
strategies involves the simple act of counting the relevant actions while more com-
plicated methods are also available. Indeed, the demonstration that this low–cost
method displays a solid performance, we think, is noteworthy.
Tenacious selection of strategies with the best response property is of particular
interest, and leads us to the tenacious selection of Nash equilibrium (TSNE here-
after): every NE in the TSNE involves less complex anticipation by all the players
and this holds strictly for least one of the players when compared with those of the
NE that are not in the TSNE.
2. Our notion involves complexity of implementation rather than that of com-
putation, and philosophical aspects of various complexity formulations are not ad-
dressed in the current study.
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After proving that tenacious selection of any nonempty set of strategy profiles
exists, we analyze the TSNE of finite normal–form games and display that it is an
idiosyncratic refinement of NE as it does not have any containment relations with
the notions of perfection, properness, persistence, among other refinement concepts.3
In fact, the TSNE equals the set of strict NE whenever there is one.4 In such cases,
apart from containing neither mixed nor weakly dominated NE while being lower
hemi continuous, the TSNE does not display a weaker refinement performance in
comparison with perfection and properness and persistence and settledness because
it is their subset and this relation may be strict. And our further findings indi-
cate that the TSNE is not logically related to these notions even when attention
is restricted to games that have no strict NE and neither redundant nor weakly
dominated actions. Moreover, we show that the TSNE does not get affected by the
elimination of strictly dominated strategies, hence, it is immune to the criticisms
of Myerson known as imperfections of perfection which were directed to perfection
(Myerson 1978). However, when there is no strict NE, both a pure NE and a mixed
NE may be in the TSNE; it may contain a weakly dominated NE, and is not lower
hemi continuous.5
The notion that is most closely related with the TSNE is persistent equilibrium
(PE, henceforth). When there is no strict NE interesting distinctions between these
notions surface. The TSNE involves “local” considerations: whether or not the be-
havior in a specified NE is plausible is judged only with pure strategies which can
appear in players’ best responses when fine perturbations are considered. On the
other hand, the minimality requirement of the essential Nash retracts in the defini-
tion of the PE implies that considerations of whether or not equilibrium behavior is
plausible may have to incorporate the whole game, hence, they are rather “global”.6
We take the stand that the actions considered to be relevant in the determination of
the plausibility of behavior in an equilibrium should involve only the pure strategies
that can appear in players’ best responses when fine perturbations are considered.
3. These are regular equilibrium (Harsanyi 1973b), essential equilibrium (Wu and
Jia-He 1962), strongly stable equilibrium (Kojima, Okada, and Shindoh 1985), and
settled equilibrium (Myerson and Weibull 2013).
4. A NE is strict if and only if deviations strictly hurt the deviators. Clearly,
strict NE must be pure.
5. In order to dismiss weak domination, one may consider the notion of tenacious
selection of undominated NE. Indeed, using our techniques, it is easy to show that
all our results continue to hold. Another alternative is to consider the tenacious
selection of perfect (alternatively, proper) equilibrium.
6. For the details and formal presentation please see the discussion following
example 4 on page 9.
3
This enables us to present the notion of the TSNE not only as a concept based on
complexity aversion, but also as one that has a similar motivation as the PE but
with the novel feature of evaluating plausibility of equilibria through local consider-
ations. But while global considerations help persistence to tackle weak domination,
the local evaluation measure of the TSNE does not discriminate between weakly
dominated NE and mixed NE. As a result, weakly dominated NE may be elements
of the TSNE.
It is useful to emphasize that the trembles employed in the current paper are due
to players’ imprecise anticipation of their opponents’ actions. Hence, our approach is
immune to the arguments of (Kreps 1990) advocating that classical refinements liter-
ature is flawed because there is no explanation for the trembles (see also (Fudenberg,
Kreps, and Levine 1988) and (Dekel and Fudenberg 1990)). Moreover, while con-
siderations with approximate common knowledge (Monderer and Samet 1989) and
employing incomplete information settings to formulate higher order beliefs (Kajii
and Morris 1997a) (Kajii and Morris 1997b) are very interesting, the current study
lies within the framework of common knowledge and complete information.
The next section presents the preliminaries and the method of tenacious selection
and section 3 the important properties of the TSNE. Section 4 concludes.
1.2 Definitions and Auxiliary Results
Let Γ = 〈N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 be a finite normal–form game where Ai is a finite
nonempty set of actions (alternatively, pure strategies) of player i ∈ N and ui :
×i∈NAi → R is agent i’s von Neumann Morgenstern utility function. We keep
the standard convention that A = ×i∈NAi and A−i = ×j 6=iAj. A mixed strategy
of player i is represented by si ∈ ∆(Ai) ≡ Si where ∆(Ai) denotes the set of all
probability distributions on Ai and si(ai) ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability that si
assigns to ai ∈ Ai with the restriction that
∑
ai∈Ai si(ai) = 1.
◦
Si denotes the interior
of Si and its members are referred to as totally mixed strategies. A strategy profile is
denoted by s ∈ ×i∈NSi ≡ S. We let S−i ≡ ×j 6=iSj,
◦
S ≡ ×i∈N
◦
Si, and
◦
S−i ≡ ×j 6=i
◦
Sj.
We say that a game has no redundant actions whenever for all i ∈ N we have
(ui(ai, a−i))a−i∈A−i 6= (ui(a′i, a−i))a−i∈A−i for any ai, a′i ∈ Ai with ai 6= a′i. Let G
be the set of finite normal–form games, and GR ⊂ G be those without redundant
actions.
The best response of player i to s−i is defined by BRi(s−i) ≡ {si ∈ Si :
ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i), for all s′i ∈ Si}. s∗ is a NE if for every i ∈ N , s∗i ∈ BRi(s∗−i).
4
The set of NE of Γ is denoted by N (Γ) ⊂ S. A NE, s∗, is strict whenever
ui(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i) > ui(s
′
i, s
∗
−i) for all i ∈ N and for all s′i ∈ Si \ {s∗i }. Ns(Γ) ⊂ A de-
notes the set of strict NE of Γ.7
Let F be a correspondence mapping X into Y where X and Y are both finite
dimensional Euclidean spaces. We say that F is lower hemi continuous if for all
x ∈ X and all {xn}n∈N ⊆ X that converges to x and for every y ∈ F (x) there
exist {yn}n∈N ⊆ Y with yn ∈ F (xn) for all n ∈ N and yn → y. Insisting on the
additional requirement that Y is compact and F is a nonempty and compact valued
correspondence, we say that F is upper hemi continuous if for all x ∈ X and all
{xn}n∈N ⊆ X with xn → x and every {yn}n∈N ⊆ Y with yn → y and yn ∈ F (xn) for
all n ∈ N implies y ∈ F (x).
An action ai ∈ Ai is strictly dominated for player i, if there exists a′i ∈ Ai \ {ai}
with ui(ai, a−i) < ui(a′i, a−i) for all a−i ∈ A−i. The game obtained from Γ by the
elimination of strictly dominated strategies is referred to as the strict dominance
truncation of Γ and is denoted by D(Γ). We say that s in Γ and s˜ in D(Γ) are
equivalent under strict domination, and denote it by s
D
= s˜, whenever for all i ∈ N it
must be that si(ai) = s˜i(ai) for any ai ∈ Ai that is not strictly dominated. Moreover,
for a given K ⊂ S in Γ and K˜ ⊂ S˜ in D(Γ), we say that K D= K˜ whenever for every
s ∈ K there exists s˜ ∈ K˜ with s D= s˜ and for every s˜′ ∈ K˜ there exists s′ ∈ K with
s′ D= s˜′. Clearly, N (Γ) D= N (D(Γ)).
An action ai ∈ Ai is weakly dominated for player i if there exists a′i ∈ Ai with
ui(ai, a−i) ≤ ui(a′i, a−i) for all a−i ∈ A−i and this inequality holds strictly for some
a−i ∈ A−i. A strategy profile s ∈ S is undominated if si(ai) = 0 for any ai ∈ Ai
that is weakly dominated.
For any given ε > 0, a totally mixed strategy s ∈
◦
S is an ε–perfect equilibrium
if for all i ∈ N and ai ∈ Ai, ai /∈ BRi(s−i) implies si(ai) ≤ ε. On the other
hand, a totally mixed strategy s ∈
◦
S is an ε–proper equilibrium if for all i ∈ N and
ai, a
′
i ∈ Ai, ui(ai, s−i) < ui(a′i, s−i) implies si(ai) ≤ εsi(a′i). s∗ is perfect (proper) if
there exists {εk} ⊂ (0, 1) and {sk} with the property that limk εk = 0 and sk an
εk–perfect (εk–proper, respectively) equilibrium for each k and limk s
k = s∗. It is
well–known that every perfect equilibrium must be proper.8
7. A related solution concept, proposed by Harsanyi (1973b), is quasi–strict equi-
librium: A NE s∗ is quasi–strict if for all i ∈ N and for all ai, a′i ∈ Ai with s∗i (ai) > 0
and s∗(bi) = 0, ui(ai, s∗−i) > ui(bi, s
∗
−i). That is, all pure strategy best responses are
required to be chosen with strictly positive probabilities.
8. The notion of regularity implies strong stability and the latter essentiality
which in turn implies strict perfection, hence, perfection (Kojima, Okada, and
5
R is a retract of S if R = ×i∈NRi where for any i ∈ N , Ri is a nonempty convex
and closed subset of Si. For any given K ⊂ S, it is said that R absorbs K if for every
s ∈ K and for any i ∈ N it must be that BRi(s−i)∩Ri 6= ∅. Any retract absorbing
itself is a Nash retract, and a retract is an essential Nash retract if it absorbs a
neighborhood of itself. It is said to be a persistent retract if it is an essential Nash
retract and is minimal with respect to this property. s ∈ S is a PE if it is a NE
contained in a persistent retract.
For any given s ∈ S and ε > 0, define Bε(s−i) ≡ {s′−i ∈ S−i : |s′−i − s−i| < ε}.
Moreover, let Sε,i(s) ≡ {ai ∈ Ai : ai ∈ BRi(s′−i) for some s′−i ∈ Bε(s−i)}, and
Sε(s) ≡ (Sε,i(s))Ni=1; Tε,i(s) ≡ |Sε,i(s)|, and Tε(s) ≡ (Tε,i(s))Ni=1. The linearity of the
expected utility functions, the upper hemi continuity of the best responses, and that
Tη(s) is bounded below delivers:
Lemma 1 For any s ∈ S and for any η, η′ > 0 with η < η′, it must be the case that
Sη(s) ⊂ Sη′(s), hence, Tη(s) ≤ Tη′(s). Moreover, for any s ∈ S, there exists η¯ > 0
such that for all η, η′ ∈ (0, η¯), Sη(s) = Sη′(s), hence, Tη(s) = Tη′(s).
This enables us to present the following:
Definition 1 For any given strategy profile s ∈ S, we define the t–index of s by
T(s) = Tη(s) where η ∈ (0, η¯) and η¯ is as given in Lemma 1. Moreover, for any
nonempty K ⊆ S, s is said to be in the tenacious selection of K, denoted by T (K),
if there is no s′ ∈ K with T(s) ≥ T(s′) and T(s) 6= T(s′).
Next, we provide an existence result without the need of any compactness re-
quirements:
Theorem 1 T (K) is nonempty for any given nonempty K ⊂ S.
Proof. For any given K ⊂ S, let s ∈ K and notice that Ti(s) ≤ |Ai|, and hence,
V ≡ ∪s∈KT(s) is a finite set in NN , so T (K) is nonempty.
An observation that may be helpful when employing the method of tenacious
selection as a bounded rationality measure involves the requirements on the knowl-
edge of rationality among players: all that is needed is that every player knows that
Shindoh 1985). And properness is implied by strong stability (van Damme 1991,
Section 2.4) and by settledness (Myerson and Weibull 2013). Moreover, due to
Jansen (1981, Theorem 7.4) and van Damme (1991, Theorem 3.4.5) a NE of a finite
two–player game is regular if and only if it is essential and all players utilize each of
their pure strategy best responses.
6
he himself is rational.9
1.3 Tenacious Selection of Nash equilibrium
This section presents our findings about the TSNE which exists due to Theorem
1.
1.3.1 Idiosyncrasy
We establish that even when attention is restricted to games without redundant
and weakly dominated actions the TSNE does not involve any containment relations
with perfection, properness, and persistence.10
Example 2 Let N = {1, 2}; Ai = {I, II}; and ui(a) = 1 if ai = aj, and 0 other-
wise, i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j. The set of NE is {(I, I), (II, II), (1/2I + 1/2II, 1/2I +
1/2II); and the TSNE equals {(I, I), (II, II)} because the t–index of every pure NE
is given by (1, 1) and that of the totally mixed NE by (2, 2).
While the mixed NE of this well–known coordination game has been employed
by Kalai and Samet (1984) to display the lack of strong neighborhood stability,
the current study associates this issue with complexities in players’ anticipation as
well.11
9. When the use of a societal ranking on the variability of prescribed actions is
plausible, t–indices may be “aggregated”: for any given f : NN → R, the aggregation
function, we let the f–induced aggregate t–order, denoted by <fT ⊂ S × S, be
defined by s<fT s′ if and only if f (T(s)) ≤ f (T(s′)). For any nonempty K ⊂ S,
s is said to be in the f–induced aggregate tenacious selection of K if s<fT s′ for
all s′ ∈ K. And, the set of f–induced aggregate tenacious selection of K ⊂ S
is denoted by T fA (K). Note that for any K ⊂ S and for any strictly increasing
f : NN → R, T fA (K) ⊂ T (K). The choice of f : NN → R determines T fA (·),
and insisting on equilibria with less variations calls for f to be strictly increasing,
and the following may be used when a symmetric treatment is desired: for any
x ∈ NN , f(x) = ∑i∈N xi. Also, <fT ⊂ S × S is complete and continuous preorder
whenever f is monotone (either nondecreasing or nonincreasing). Theorem 1 extends
to this setting without the need of using any monotonicity requirements: T fA (K) is
nonempty for any nonempty K ⊂ S and any f : NN → R. This follows from:
f(V ) ⊂ R, V ≡ ∪s∈KT(s), is finite, thus, it possesses a minimal element, f (T(s∗)),
s∗ ∈ K. So, s∗<fT s for all s ∈ K, thus, s∗ ∈ T fA (K).
10. Weakening any one of these requirements makes the identification of desired
examples easier.
11. Adopting rationalistic interpretation in normal form games (for a formal dis-
cussion of these ideas, see Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) and Kuhn (1996))
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Example 3 In the following game player 1 chooses rows, 2 columns, and 3 matri-
ces:
3
I II
1\2 I II
I (1, 1, 0) (1, 0, 1)
II (1, 1, 1) (0, 0, 1)
1\2 I II
I (1, 0, 1) (0, 1, 0)
II (0, 1, 0) (1, 0, 0)
The NE are sp = ((1−p)I+pII, I, I) where p ≥ 1/2 and s2 = (I, 1/2I+1/2II, 1/2I+
1/2II) (while only s2 is perfect and proper).12 Both s1 and s2 are in the TSNE
because T(sp) equals (2, 1, 1) if p > 1/2 and (2, 1, 2) when p = 1/2, and T(s2) =
(1, 2, 2).
The game of example 3, possessing neither any redundant actions nor weakly
dominated actions nor a strict NE, also displays that the TSNE is not an impassable
barrier to mixed strategies: both a pure NE and a mixed NE are in the TSNE.13
Example 4 The following is a coordination game where one of the pure actions in
which players are not coordinated is replaced by a matching pennies:
1\2 I II III
I (1, 1) (2,−2) (−2, 2)
II (1, 1) (−2, 2) (2,−2)
III (0, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1)
delivers a counterintuitive observation associated with the mixed NE in coordination
games which is elegantly described by Harsanyi (1973a, p.1) as follows: “Equilib-
rium points in mixed strategies seem to be unstable, because any player can deviate
without penalty from his equilibrium strategy even if he expects all other players to
stick to theirs.” Kalai and Samet (1984) observes these local variations around the
mixed NE in coordination games are due to the lack of strong neighborhood sta-
bility; Young (2009) eliminates such mixed NE by employing a learning procedure,
interactive trial and error learning, that selects only the pure NE in this game.
12. Perfection follows because (1) regardless of the magnitudes of player 2 and 3’s
strictly positive mistakes around mixing I and II with equal probabilities action I
for player 1 is the only best response; and (2) every finite normal form game has to
possess a PE which has to be Nash.
13. The observations in footnote 8 imply further conclusions of idiosyncrasy when
comparing the TSNE with the notions of regularity, essentiality, and strong stability.
This is because the totally mixed strategy NE in example 2 is regular but not in the
TSNE. And s1 of example 3 is in the TSNE but not perfect.
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Here, the NE, perfect equilibria, proper equilibria, and the PE coincide: s1 =
(1/4I + 1/4II + 1/2III, 1/2I + 1/4II + 1/4III), s2 = (III, 1/4II + 3/4III),
s3 = (III, 3/4II+ 1/4III), s4 = (3/4I+ 1/4II, I), s5 = (1/4I+ 3/4II, I). Because
that the t–index of s1 is given by (3, 3) and the others’ by (2, 2), s1 is not in the
TSNE.
This game has no redundant and weakly dominated actions and no strict NE.14
Additionally, it displays an important distinction between persistence and our con-
cept: the former, but not the latter, entails that whether or not behavior in a
specified equilibrium is plausible may depend on the presence or absence of pure
strategies that do not appear in players’ best responses when fine perturbations are
considered. In other words, while the TSNE employs “local” performance measures
when evaluating the performances of NE, the method of evaluation of persistence is
rather “global”. To see this, it suffices to restrict attention to s1 and s2. First, ob-
serve that s1, while being a PE but not in the TSNE, is a totally mixed NE and the
persistent retract it is contained in is S. Moreover, Si(s1) = {I, II, III}, i = 1, 2.
Second, with persistence (unlike the TSNE) s1 is not eliminated by s2 because of the
following: R = ×i=1,2Ri and Ri = {s2i } for i = 1, 2, is a Nash retract but not essen-
tial because it cannot absorb a neighborhood of itself which is due to both players
being indifferent between II and III in s2. Indeed, Si(s2) = {II, III}, i = 1, 2.
Yet, the Nash retract defined by R′ = ×i=1,2R′i with R′i = {(0, xi, 1−xi) : xi ∈ [0, 1]}
is not essential (due to the inherent matching pennies feature) because for ε > 0
sufficiently small (ε, 1− 2ε, ε) is a point in the neighborhood of R′2 to which player
1’s corresponding best response calls for (1, 0, 0) and (1, 0, 0)∩R′1 = ∅. Hence, R′ is
not a persistent retract due to the pure strategy I even though I /∈ S1(s2). So with
persistence s1 is not eliminated by s2 due to I, an action which does not appear in
player 1’s best responses when the other is choosing a strategy either close or equal
to s22. Similarly, s
k, k = 3, 4, 5, do not eliminate s1 with persistence.
Example 5 Consider the following four player game: Players 1 and 2 play the
game on the left in the following table independent of the choices of players 3 and
4; players 3 and 4 play the game in the middle when players 1 and 2 choose (I, I)
or (II, II) and the game on the right when 1 and 2 choose (I, II) or (II, I).
14. It should be noted that the pure NE of the coordination game are strict. That
is why the game given in example 4 is the one that we employ when dealing with
the formal relation between perfection/properness and the TSNE because it has no
redundant and weakly dominated actions and no strict NE.
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1\2 I II
I (1, 1) (0, 0)
II (0, 0) (1, 1)
3\4 III IV
III (1, 0) (0, 1)
IV (0, 1) (1, 0)
3\4 III IV
III (2, 2) (2, 0)
IV (0, 2) (0, 0)
Here, s = (1/2I + 1/2II, 1/2I + 1/2II, III, III) is in the TSNE, but is not persis-
tent.15
Therefore, not every element in the TSNE is a PE even when there are neither
redundant nor weakly dominated actions and no strict NE. Moreover, the essence
of the distinction between persistence and the TSNE in the context of this game is
the very same as that in the context of the game of example 4. However, this time
global considerations of persistence help to eliminate s which is not eliminated by
employing local concerns of the TSNE.
Our idiosyncrasy result, due to examples 3–5, is:
Theorem 6 Even when attention is restricted to games without redundant and
weakly dominated actions, the TSNE does not have any containment relations with
perfection and properness and persistence whenever there is no strict NE.16
15. In order to observe that s is in the TSNE, note that there is no pure strategy
NE in this game (hence, the set of strict NE is empty). Note further that there is
no NE where only one player mixes among his strategies. Therefore, in all NE at
least two players randomize. Hence, this game involves t–indices with at least two
numbers strictly exceeding 1. Now, considering s we have that Ti(s) = 2, i = 1, 2,
and Tj(s) = 1, j = 3, 4: players i = 1, 2 are randomizing in NE, and j = 3, 4 are
choosing III and if player 1 and player 2 make small mistakes player 3 and 4’s best
responses will still be III (due to the strict dominance in the game on the right).
Hence, T(s) = (2, 2, 1, 1) which is the best t–index that can be achieved in this game.
But s is not a PE. For any ε > 0, the best response of player 1 against the following
perturbation is II: (((1/2 − ε)I + (1/2 + ε)II), ((1/2 − ε)I + (1/2 + ε)II), (1 −
ε)III + εIV, (1 − ε)III + εIV ). Similarly, I is player 1’s only best response when
this perturbation is reversed. Moreover, for the retract defined by ∆({I, II}) for
players 1 and 2 and III for the others is not persistent. Because when players 1 and
2 choose (I, I) (or (II, II)), the persistent retract in the middle game (of the above
table) is (∆({III, IV }))2. Therefore, there is no persistent retract which includes
this NE other than the whole game. Also, note that there is a persistent retract:
neighborhoods around I for player 1 and 2, and ∆({III, IV }) for players 3 and 4.
For any strategy in this retract, the best response of first and second players are
still I. Third and fourth players best responses to this tremble will be trivially be
in this retract as well. So there is a persistent retract other than the whole game
which contains the NE given by (I, I, 1/2I + 1/2II, 1/2I + 1/2II), but not s.
16. It is useful to point out that considering example 3, a game that does not
have a strict NE, delivers a similar idiosyncrasy result concerning the TSNE and
the quasi–strict equilibrium: (1) s0.50 is a quasi–strict equilibrium that is not in the
TSNE, and (2) s1 is in the TSNE but is not a quasi–strict equilibrium.
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1.3.2 Domination and Strict NE
The following presents properties of the TSNE in relation with domination and
strict NE:
Theorem 7 The following hold:
1. The TSNE does not change with strict dominance truncations.
2. Suppose that the game possesses a strict NE. Then, the TSNE
(a) equals the set of strict NE;
(b) contains neither weakly dominated NE nor mixed NE;
(c) is a subset of the lower hemi continuous selection of NE;
(d) is a subset of the set of perfect equilibrium, proper equilibrium, and PE.
And there are games possessing a strict NE but neither redundant nor
weakly dominated actions where this relation is strict.
3. If the game does not have a strict NE, then the following hold:
(a) mixed strategy NE and pure NE may both be in the TSNE even if the game
at hand is one that does not have any redundant and weakly dominated
actions;
(b) the TSNE may contain a weakly dominated NE even if the game under
analysis does not have any redundant actions;
(c) the TSNE is not lower hemi continuous even when the game at hand does
not have redundant and weakly dominated actions.
We wish to discuss direct implications of and issues about this theorem before
its proof.
First, it should be emphasized that when evaluating the performance of our
notion against strict domination we do not encounter the type of problems often
cited in the discussion of “imperfections of perfection” (see Myerson (1978)).17 To
see this, consider the following:
Example 8 First, consider the strict dominance truncation of the following game:
17. Kohlberg’s Example is also based on a similar observation (Kohlberg and
Mertens 1986).
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1\2 I II III
I (1, 1) (0, 0) (1,−1)
II (0, 0) (0, 0) (2,−1)
III (−1, 1) (−1, 2) (−1,−1)
The NE are s = (I, I) and s′ = (II, II), but only s is perfect.18 But considering
strictly dominated strategies as well results in II not being weakly dominated. NE
and perfect equilibria coincide and are equal to s = (I, I) and s′ = (II, II). But in
both cases T(s) = (1, 1) and T(s′) = (2, 2), so the TSNE equals {s}.
The second point concerns our finding that the TSNE exhibits stronger refine-
ment powers than the other refinements of NE when the game at hand possesses
a strict NE. To see that the associated containment relation with perfection and
properness may be strict in such situations, consider example 2. On the other, the
following example performs the same task in conjunction with persistence under the
same restrictions:
Example 9 This game is one that has a strict NE but no redundant and weakly
dominated actions, and the TSNE is a strict subset of the set of PE.
1\2 I II III
I (10, 10) (0, 0) (0, 0)
II (0, 0) (3, 1) (1, 3)
III (0, 0) (1, 3) (3, 1)
Here, s1 = (I, I) is a strict NE which, therefore, is not empty. Thus, the TSNE
equals the set of strict NE, hence, does not contain the mixed strategy NE, s2 =
(1/2II + 1/2III, 1/2II + 1/2III). But s2 is a PE: R = ×i=1,2Ri defined by Ri =
{(0, x, 1− x) : x ∈ [0, 1]}, i = 1, 2, is an essential Nash retract because (1) for ε > 0
sufficiently small the best-responses of agents against (ε, x, 1−x− ε) do not contain
I; (2) it is minimal.
The third remark about Theorem 7 concerns the performance of the TSNE when
there is no strict NE. Example 3, a game with no redundant and weakly dominated
18. A similar conclusion holds in the following extensive–form game with an “in-
credible threat”: player 1 chooses first. If his choice is I, the game ends and player
1 obtains a return of 1 and player 2 a payoff of 2. When player 1 chooses II, players
obtain a payoff vector of (2, 1) if player 2’s choice is I and (0, 0) otherwise. The NE
are (II, I) and (I, αI + (1− α)II), α ≤ 1/2. For s = (II, I) we have T(s) = (1, 1),
and T(s′) = (1, 2) for any other NE s′. So the TSNE equals (II, I) eliminating all
the NE involving incredible threats.
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actions, shows (1) both pure strategy and a mixed strategy NE may be in the TSNE,
and (2) this notion may not be lower hemi continuous.19 Theorem 7 also contains a
warning even without redundant actions: the TSNE may contain weakly dominated
NE. This is due to the following:
Example 10 This game has no strict NE and no redundant actions, but two NE:
s = (II, II, II) and s′ = (1/2I + 1/2II, 1/2I + 1/2II, I).
3
I II
1\2 I II
I (1, 0, 1) (0, 1, 1)
II (0, 1, 0) (1, 0, 0)
1\2 I II
I (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0)
II (0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0)
s, involving a weakly dominated action by player 3, is in the TSNE: T(s) = (1, 1, 2)
and T(s′) = (2, 2, 1).
The TSNE may not eliminate weak domination because when there is no strict
NE it may not be able discriminate between weak domination and randomization:
in example 10, T3(s) = 2 because s3 = II is a weakly dominated action for player
3; Ti(s′) = 2 because s′i = 1/2I + 1/2II for i = 1, 2 is totally mixed. But weak
domination is not permitted with persistence (Kalai and Samet 1984, Theorem 4,
p.139)) due to the minimality requirement of essential Nash retracts. Therefore,
the global evaluation measure embedded in persistence results in the elimination
of weak domination, while the local means of evaluation with the TSNE does not
suffice towards this regard.
This observation is why our analysis can be extended to the tenacious selection
of undominated NE, the TSUNE. It is important to point out that in all the games
handled previously, with the exception of the last one, the TSNE coincides with the
TSUNE. Moreover, the other items of Theorem 7 hold with the TSUNE as well.
Proof of Theorem 7. The first item of the above theorem stated formally is:
For any Γ ∈ G, T (N (Γ)) D= T (N (D(Γ))). Because that for any Γ we have that
19. The lack of lower hemi continuity follows from the example 3 which has two NE
s1 = (II, I, I) and s2 = (I, 1/2I+1/2II, 1/2I+1/2II), and both s1 and s2 are in the
TSNE. I is player 1’s only best response whenever one considers a strategy profile
arbitrarily close to s1 with the requirement that players 2 and 3 are choosing action
II with strictly positive probabilities. Hence, we can come up with a sequence of
games (each of which does not have any redundant and weakly dominated actions)
converging to the one given in example 3 for which the unique TSNE would be only
around s2.
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N (Γ) D= N (D(Γ)), we prove that for any s ∈ N (D(Γ)) and s′ ∈ N (Γ) with s′ D= s
it must be that TΓi (s′) = T
D(Γ)
i (s) for all i ∈ N . Then, the definition of the TSNE
implies that s ∈ T (N (D(Γ))) if and only if s′ ∈ T (N (Γ)) where s′ D= s.
Let TD(Γ)i (s) = k. That means, s may involve one of k pure strategy best re-
sponses for player i in the game D(Γ). Now, as all the pure strategies in D(Γ) are
available in Γ and s′, obtained from s through assigning 0 probabilities to strictly
dominated actions in Γ (i.e. s′ D= s), is such that s′i ∈ BRΓi (s′−i) for all i ∈ N , it
cannot be that TΓi (s) < k. Hence, suppose TΓi (s′) = ` > k. Due to T
D(Γ)
i (s) = k we
know that there exists ε˜ > 0 such that for all η˜, η˜′ < ε˜ we have SD(Γ)η˜,i (s) = S
D(Γ)
η˜′,i (s)
and |SD(Γ)η˜,i | = k. So due to the upper hemi continuity of the best response corre-
spondence it must be that the support of BRD(Γ)i (s−i) is equal to SD(Γ)η˜,i (s) for η˜ < ε˜.
Similarly, the observation that TΓi (s′) = ` implies that there exists ε > 0 such that
for all η, η′ < ε we have SΓη,i(s′) = SΓη′,i(s′) and |SΓη,i(s′)| = `. Therefore, because
of the upper hemi continuity of the best responses the support of BRΓi (s′−i) equals
SΓη,i(s′) for η < ε. Letting ε¯ < min{ε, ε˜}, these imply that there exists a∗i ∈ Ai
such that ai ∈ BRΓi (s′−i) but ai /∈ BRD(Γ)i (s−i). This is a contradiction because
BRΓi (s′−i) D= BRD(Γ)i (s−i): D(Γ) is a strict dominance truncation of Γ, and on ac-
count of being a NE s−i and s′−i do not assign strictly positive probabilities to
strictly dominated strategies, and player i cannot assign strictly positive probabili-
ties to strictly dominated actions in his best response.
In order to prove item 2a we show the following: Let Γ ∈ G be such that
Ns(Γ) 6= ∅; then, T (N (Γ)) = Ns(Γ). This follows from (1) the observation that for
any strict NE, s∗, it must be that Ti(s∗) = 1 for all i ∈ N ; (2) for any NE that is not
strict, s′, there exists j ∈ N such that Tj(s′) > 1. Both 2b and 2c are immediate
consequences of 2a.20 Regarding the proof of item 2d, notice that the fact that
every TSNE must be a strict NE implies that for any s∗ in the TSNE it must be
that there exists η¯ > 0 such that for all η ∈ (0, η¯) we have Sη,i(s∗) = {s∗i } (in turn,
implying that Ti(s∗) = 1) for all i ∈ N . This supplies the strictly positive payoff
slack/buffer with which such equilibria can withstand sufficiently fine perturbations.
Hence, every strict NE must be perfect and proper. Moreover, because of the same
reasons R, defined by R = ×i∈NRi with Ri = {s∗i } for all i ∈ N , is a persistent
retract and this implies that s∗ a PE. Examples 2 and 9 show that this containment
relation of the TSNE concerning perfection and properness and persistence may be
strict even when the game at hand is in GR and has no weakly dominated actions.
20. It is appropriate to point out that, in these cases there may be members of
the lower hemi continuous selection of NE that are not in the TSNE. To see this,
consider the coordination game of example 2 and notice that the mixed NE of that
game is in the lower hemi continuous selection of NE but not in the TSNE.
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Part 3 follows from examples 3 and 10. This finishes the proof of Theorem 7.
1.4 Concluding Remarks
Our first remark concerns the evaluation of the performances of the TSNE and
persistence when attention is restricted to the unanimity games. Let the set of
actions of every player be given by a finite set C, i.e. Ai = C for all i ∈ N . An
action profile c¯ ∈ CN is called diagonal if it is of the form (c, c, . . . , c) for some
c ∈ C. It is assumed that ui(a) = 0 for every i ∈ N and for all a ∈ CN that is not
diagonal. And a′ ∈ CN is positive if ui(a′) > 0 for every i ∈ N . Naturally, if an
action profile is positive, then it is diagonal. Kalai and Samet (1984, Theorem 6)
establishes that an action vector is persistent if and only if it is positive provided
that the unanimity game at hand has a positive action profile.
Item 2a of Theorem 7 delivers additional insight with the help of Theorem 6 of
Kalai and Samet (1984): if the unanimity game has a positive action vector, then
the TSNE and the PE and positive action profiles coincide: If a′ ∈ CN is positive,
then it is a strict NE because for every i ∈ N it must be that ui(a′) > 0 = ui(ai, a′−i)
for every ai ∈ Ai \ {a′i}. So the TSNE equals the set of strict NE, and it is not
difficult to see that the set of strict NE equals the set of positive action vectors.
The second remark involves the relation of the TSNE with a recent and elegant
refinement, the notion of settled equilibrium due to Myerson and Weibull (2013)
(MW hereafter). It is aimed to exclude uncoordinated NE “for more games than
persistence, while maintaining general existence of a refined equilibrium that is also
proper.” Due to space considerations, the definition of this equilibrium notion is
omitted and we refer the reader to MW. Even though our desiderata is similar with
MW’s, below we display that these refinement concepts are idiosyncratic.
When the game under analysis has a strict NE, it is not surprising to observe
that the TSNE is a subset of the set of fully settled equilibrium. Moreover, example
9 shows that this relation may be strict: Both s1 and s2 are fully settled while the
TSNE equals {s1}. Meanwhile, the next example establishes that when the given
game does not have a strict NE, then the TSNE and the settled equilibrium are not
logically related.
Example 11 This game has no strict NE and neither redundant nor weakly dom-
inated actions, and is obtained by combining two “blocks” consisting of rescaled
versions of example 4 of MW and a rock–scissor–paper.
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1\2 A B C D I II III
A (0, 5) (1, 4) (0, 3) (1, 0) (−1,−1) (−1,−1) (−1,−1)
B (1, 0) (0, 3) (1, 4) (0, 5) (−1,−1) (−1,−1) (−1,−1)
I (−1,−1) (−1,−1) (−1,−1) (−1,−1) (1, 1) (2, 0) (0, 2)
II (−1,−1) (−1,−1) (−1,−1) (−1,−1) (0, 2) (1, 1) (2, 0)
III (−1,−1) (−1,−1) (−1,−1) (−1,−1) (2, 0) (0, 2) (1, 1)
It can be verified that here s1 = (1/2A + 1/2B, 1/2B + 1/2C) is not fully settled
while it is in the TSNE; and s2 = (1/3I + 1/3II + 1/3III, 1/3I + 1/3II + 1/3III)
is fully settled but not in the TSNE.
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CHAPTER 2
AGGREGATE EFFICIENCY IN RANDOM ASSIGNMENT
PROBLEMS
2.1 Introduction
Random assignment problems are allocation problems allotting some number
of distinct indivisible alternatives among a population of agents with the use of a
randomization device, e.g. the flip of a coin or the use of a dice, but without the
use of monetary transfers. They constitute a non-negligible and often important
aspect in our everyday life. Indeed, in recent years the surge of the use of random
assignment methods by market designers and social planners has been significant.
Relevant examples include student placement in public schools at various levels of
education, organ transplantation, and the assignment of dormitory rooms. While
many of these applications are implemented all over the world, Turkey, the country
of our residence, features another important example: In the fields of medicine and
education and justice, recent graduates are assigned to their places of duty via a
random allotment arrangement.21
Among random assignment mechanisms, rules associating any (reported) prefer-
ence profile with a stochastic distribution of alternatives to the agents, the random
priority mechanism (henceforth, to be referred to as RP) is one of the most widely
used and it has been analyzed extensively in Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (1998). It
is also called the random serial dictatorship mechanism and defined as follows: A
priority ranking of agents is selected uniformly, and following that rank every agent
sequentially receives his favorite alternative among the ones that were not chosen by
higher ranked agents. That study shows that even though the particular form of this
mechanism is surprisingly simple, it is strategyproof (i.e. reporting the true prefer-
ences is a dominant strategy) and ex–post efficient (i.e. it can be represented by a
21. We refer the reader to Roth and Sotomayor (1992) for a classic source on
the subject. On the other hand, for more details on random assignment problems,
we cite to (Hylland and Zeckhauser 1979), (Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez 1998),
Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (1999), Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001), Bogomolnaia
and Moulin (2002), Chen, Sonmez, and Unver (2002), Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez
(2003), Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004), Roth, Sonmez, and Unver (2004), Ergin
and Sonmez (2006), Katta and Sethuraman (2006), Kesten (2009), Kojima (2009),
Yilmaz (2009), Yilmaz (2010), Kesten and Unver (2011), Hashimoto, Hirata, Kesten,
Kurino, and Unver (forthcoming).
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probability distribution over efficient deterministic assignments). Another efficiency
notion may be used when the problem at hand features von Neumann–Morgenstern
utilities: A random assignment is ex–ante efficient if it is Pareto optimal with re-
spect to the profile of von Neumann–Morgenstern utilities. Bogomolnaia and Moulin
(2001) (henceforth, BM) shows that by using only the ordinal preference rankings
some of the random assignments that are not ex–ante efficient may be identified even
if agents’ utility functions are not given. To that regard that study proposes ordinal
efficiency which necessitates the consideration of (first order) stochastic dominance.
A random assignment stochastically dominates another one whenever for all agents
the probability of being allocated one of the top k ranked alternatives under the
former is weakly higher than the one under the latter for all k = 1, . . . , K where
K denotes the total number of available alternatives. A random assignment is or-
dinally efficient for a given profile of preferences if there is no random assignment
stochastically dominating it for that given profile of preferences. BM shows that
ex–ante efficiency implies ordinal efficiency and ordinal efficiency implies ex–post
efficiency. The reverse directions of these two relations do not hold. Due to McLen-
nan (2002), it is also known that if a random assignment is ordinally efficient then
there is a profile of von Neumann–Morgenstern utilities such that that particular
random assignment is ex–ante efficient. Motivated by its key finding that RP is
not an ordinally efficient mechanism BM introduces and analyzes the probabilistic
serial (henceforth, PS) mechanism. The outcome of the PS mechanism is identified
using BM’s simultaneous eating algorithm (SEA): Each object is considered as a
continuum of probability shares. Agents “eat away” from their favorite objects si-
multaneously and at the same speed, and once the favorite object of an agent is gone
he turns to his next favorite object, and so on. The amount of an object eaten away
by an agent in this process is interpreted as the probability with which he is assigned
this object under the PS mechanism. BM shows that PS satisfies ordinal efficiency
but is not strategyproof. It satisfies the following weaker version: A random assign-
ment mechanism is weak strategyproof whenever the random allocation sustained by
an agent misrepresenting his preferences stochastically dominates the one he obtains
under truthful revelation implies that the two allocations are the same. This short-
coming concerning incentives is made up by some gains in terms of envy–freeness,
another relevant notion to judge the value–added of a random assignment mecha-
nism. A random assignment mechanism is envy–free if it associates every profile of
preferences with a random assignment in which the prescribed random allocation
for any agent stochastically dominates that for another agent evaluated with the
former’s preferences. Meanwhile, relaxing this notion delivers weak envy–freeness
by requiring that the prescribed random allocation for any agent satisfying the fol-
lowing: The random allocation of another agent stochastically dominating that of
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the agent at hand implies that the two random allocations are the same. The same
study proves that while the PS mechanism involves envy–freeness, the RP rule is
weakly envy–free (but not envy–free).
Insisting on ordinal efficiency may create unappealing features. When assigning
100 objects among a population of 100 both of the following assignments may be
efficient: The first allocating 1 person to his best and 99 to their second best, and
the second allotting 99 to their best and 1 to their second best.22 Indeed, there are
many instances where social planners and market designers evaluate a mechanism
by considering how many agents are located into their first best, how many into
their second choice, and so on. Often some statistics about how many agents are
allocated their higher ranking choices is announced as a positive indicator of the
performance of the system.23
The current paper introduces a new notion of efficiency, aggregate efficiency, tai-
lored for situations in which social planners and market designers value the expected
number of agents assigned to their higher ranked choices: We say that a random
assignment aggregate stochastic dominates another whenever the expected number
of agents placed into one of their top k choices under the former is weakly higher
than that of the latter for k = 1, . . . , K. Moreover, a random assignment is aggre-
gate efficient whenever another random allocation aggregate stochastic dominating
the one under consideration implies that both of them assign the same expected
number of agents into any one of their top k choices for k = 1, . . . , K.
We establish that the notion of aggregate efficiency implies ordinal efficiency. Yet
22. Consider a situation where there are 100 agents and 100 objects denoted by
{aj}100j=1, on which the strict preference relations are as follows: Agent 1 strictly
prefers a1 to a100, and a100 to any other alternative, and all other alternatives are
ranked strictly lower and arbitrarily. Every other agent i 6= 1 strictly prefers ai−1
to ai, and ai to any other alternative, and all other alternatives are ranked strictly
lower and arbitrarily. In this setting assigning each agent i to alternative ai is
(ordinally) efficient, and creates a situation in which one player (agent 1) gets his
first best while all the other 99 players obtain their second ranked choice. On the
other hand, assigning agent 1 to his second best alternative a100 and any other agent
i to alternative ai−1 is also (ordinally) efficient and causes one agent to obtain his
second best while 99 of them are allotted their first ranked choice.
23. OSYM, the Turkish government agency responsible of administering the
nation-wide university admission examination and allocating students to programs,
includes the percentage of students allocated to one of their top three choices in
their press conferences. Moreover, Featherstone (2011), an independent study that
was brought to our attention when the final draft of this paper was being prepared,
observes that reports by NYC Department of Education 2009 and San Fransisco
Unified School District 2011 also include such aspects.
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the reverse does not hold and there are no logical relations between ex–ante efficiency
and aggregate efficiency. After proving the existence of aggregate efficiency, we show
that Gale’s conjecture, the incompatibility of strategyproof and efficient mechanisms
treating equals equally, takes a new form: The search for an aggregate efficient and
weak strategyproof mechanism treating equals equally is futile.
On the other hand, we prove that there is a weak strategyproof, weak envy–free,
and ordinally efficient mechanism, the reservation–1 mechanism (henceforth, R1),
that displays a better performance on grounds of aggregate efficiency when compared
to the PS mechanism. The outcome of the R1 mechanism is also identified using
the SEA with an important modification that provides agents reservation rights for
their most favorite alternatives. That is, the algorithm starts with agents “eating
away” from their favorite objects simultaneously all at the same speed while no
agent (who is finished with his favorite alternative) is allowed to start eating an
alternative that is a favorite for some other agent. Once these favorite objects are
gone, the algorithm proceeds exactly as the unmodified SEA does. Naturally, the
amount of an object eaten away by an agent in this process is interpreted as the
probability with which he is assigned this object under the R1 mechanism.
A characterization of the R1 mechanism is provided along the lines of a recent
important study, Hashimoto, Hirata, Kesten, Kurino, and Unver (forthcoming).
This establishes that the R1 mechanism is nothing but the PS mechanism modified
to satisfy a principle decreed by the Turkish parliament on the issue of the random
assignment of new doctors to their places of duty.
The organization of the paper is as follows: The next section provides intuition
and motivation for the efficiency notion proposed and contains an elucidative dis-
cussion of our results. Then section 3 presents the model. In section 4 we analyze
aggregate efficiency and obtain some impossibility results. Section 5 introduces and
contains the detailed analysis and full characterization of the R1 mechanism.
2.2 Aggregate Efficiency and the R1 Mechanism
In order to facilitate an easier reading and more motivation we wish to intro-
duce the notion of aggregate efficiency and present our results in the context of the
following simple example with 3 agents and 3 alternatives. The set of players is
N = {1, 2, 3} and the set of alternatives A = {a, b, c}. The preferences of agents are
given by a 1 b 1 c, a 2 b 2 c, and b 3 a 3 c, where x i y denotes agent i
strictly preferring x to y.
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I. a b c
1 1 0 0
2 0 1 0
3 0 0 1
II. a b c
1 0 1 0
2 1 0 0
3 0 0 1
III. a b c
1 1 0 0
2 0 0 1
3 0 1 0
IV. a b c
1 0 0 1
2 1 0 0
3 0 1 0
TABLE I
The deterministic efficient assignments.
N\A a b c
1 1/2 1/6 1/3
2 1/2 1/6 1/3
3 0 2/3 1/3
N\A a b c
1 1/2 0 1/2
2 1/2 0 1/2
3 0 1 0
TABLE II
Two random assignments.
The deterministic efficient assignments are given in table I. In fact, in matrices
I and II player 3 is assigned to c, his least preferred alternative, and one of players
1 and 2 get his favorite alternative a while the other consumes his second best,
alternative b. Therefore, one player is given his most favorite one his second best
and one his worst. On the other hand, in permutation matrices III and IV two
players are achieving their first best while one player has to bear his least preferred
alternative.
When the society values the number of agents allocated to their higher ranked
alternatives, the dismissal of the efficient matrices I and II can be justified on
grounds of an “aggregate” efficiency notion. Consequently, both III and IV can be
labeled as aggregate efficient deterministic assignments because there are no other
permutation matrices that beat them on grounds of this efficiency notion. Moreover,
when one extends this analysis to random assignment settings, this notion implies
that no strictly positive weights should be given to permutation matrices I and II.
Indeed, in this example any convex combination of III and IV would be aggregate
efficient.24
On the other hand, when one employs the RP rule and/or the PS mechanism the
resulting random assignments coincide and are given by the table on the left hand
side of table II. It should be pointed out that under the RP and PS mechanisms
the permutation matrices I and II are realized with a probability of 1/6 each and
III and IV with a probability of 1/3 each. Hence, the expected number of agents
ranked into their top choices is 5/3 and the top two 2 and, naturally, the top three
24. In general, convex combinations of aggregate efficient deterministic assign-
ments are not necessarily aggregate efficient.
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3. Noticing that the same figures are given by 2,2, and 3 for the aggregate efficient
random assignment, this example establishes that both the RP and PS are not
aggregate efficient as they are aggregate stochastic dominated. This follows from
(2, 2, 3) ≥ (5/3, 2, 3) and (2, 2, 3) 6= (5/3, 2, 3). The same example also shows that
there are ordinally efficient random assignments, the one given by RP and PS, which
are not aggregate efficient.
After proving the existence of an aggregate efficient random assignment, we show
that the set of aggregate efficient random assignments is a subset of the set of ordi-
nally efficient random allotments and that aggregate efficient random assignments
are decomposed only to aggregate efficient permutation matrices. These establish
that in any realized state of the world the outcome of an aggregate efficient random
assignment must be not only be efficient but also aggregate efficient. Furthermore,
ex–ante efficiency and aggregate efficiency are not logically related, i.e. these two
notions of efficiency do not have any containment relations between each other. In
general, there are von Neumann–Morgenstern utility profiles for which the first of
two ordinally efficient random allotments is aggregate efficient and not ex–ante ef-
ficient and the second ex–ante efficient but not aggregate efficient.25 On the other
hand, it needs to be mentioned that using McLennan (2002) and our result that ag-
gregate efficiency implies ordinal efficiency it can be concluded that for every aggre-
gate efficient random assignment there exists a profile of von Neumann–Morgenstern
utilities with which that particular random assignment is ex–ante efficient.
These findings, naturally, makes one wonder about aggregate efficient and strat-
egyproof mechanisms. Yet one should not forget Gale’s conjecture about the in-
compatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness. It is useful to remind the reader
that considering deterministic environments Zhou (1990) proves that efficiency and
strategyproofness cannot be simultaneously satisfied by a mechanism treating equals
equally. BM extends this result to random assignment problems and prove that there
is no mechanism treating equals equally and satisfying ordinal efficiency and strat-
egyproofness. Thus, the mechanism they propose, the PS mechanism, being weak
strategyproof is of significance.
In the current study we show that Gale’s conjecture takes a new form: We prove
that there is no mechanism treating equals equally and satisfying aggregate effi-
ciency and weak strategyproofness. Moreover, another impossibility result involves
a weaker notion of envy–freeness and a stronger efficiency concept: There is no
mechanism satisfying aggregate efficiency and weak envy–freeness.
25. We refer the reader to example 16 in the proof of Theorem 15 which is ob-
tained from the above example by a particular choice of von Neumann–Morgenstern
utilities.
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While these results ensure that the search for an aggregate efficient and weak
strategyproof mechanism satisfying the equal treatment property is futile, they do
not rule out the possibility of an improvement upon the PS mechanism in terms of
the notion of aggregate efficiency. Indeed, it turns out that a relevant and interest-
ing observation can be found in Turkey in the context of the random assignment
mechanism used in the allotment of new doctors to their specific places of duty.
The Turkish lawmaker decrees that the following principle has to be obeyed: (1)
whenever a new doctor is the only one ranking a place of duty as the highest, then
he is allocated that particular place of duty; and (2) if there are more than one
new doctors ranking a particular place of duty as their highest, then one of them
is selected with a random draw.26 This requirement, which we name condition T,
results in the bistochastic matrix on the right hand side of table II.
The above example establishes that the RP and PS do not satisfy condition
T and are both not aggregate efficient. Meanwhile, it also shows that there are
ordinally efficient random assignments that are not aggregate efficient.27 While
condition T produced an aggregate efficient allocation in this example, in general
we also show that there are situations in which there exists an ordinally efficient
random allocation satisfying condition T but not aggregate efficiency, and there is
an aggregate efficient random allotment that do not satisfy condition T.28
On the other hand, imposing condition T on the PS mechanism produces a
weak strategyproof rule that is weak envy-free and outperforms the PS mechanism
in terms of aggregate efficiency: the R1 mechanism. We prove that this mechanism
aggregate stochastic dominates the PS mechanism and preserves all of the impor-
tant properties of the PS mechanism with the exception of envy–freeness: The R1
mechanism is weak strategyproof and ordinally efficient and weak envy–free (but
not envy–free).
Imposing condition T in the characterization of the R1 mechanism involves the
modification of two axioms of a recent and important study, Hashimoto, Hirata,
Kesten, Kurino, and Unver (forthcoming) (HHKKU, hereafter). These two axioms,
ordinal fairness and non-wastefulness, fully characterize the PS mechanism. As
elegantly put by some of these authors in the working paper version of this study
(Kesten, Kurino, and Unver 2011), ordinal fairness follows “whenever an agent is
26. We refer the reader to the Official Journal of Republic of Turkey 16 November
1996 issue number 22819.
27. Considering the example given in BM (Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001, p.298),
one can easily show that the resulting random assignments of the PS and the ag-
gregate efficiency coincide while both are different from the outcome of the RP.
28. See the first example in the proof of Theorem 17.
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assigned some object with positive probability, his surplus at this object is no greater
than that of any other agent at the same object”; and non-wastefulness whenever
“the surplus of no agent at any object can be raised through the use of an unassigned
probability share of some object”.29
The current study provides a full characterization of the R1 mechanism by em-
ploying versions of these axioms modified to make them satisfy condition T. Indeed,
the imposition of condition T on the PS is obtained as follows: HHKKU’s axiom con-
cerning efficiency (non-wastefulness) is modified to satisfy the first part of condition
T and their fairness axiom (ordinal fairness) is updated by the second part. Conse-
quently, our axioms are T-ordinal fairness and T-non-wastefulness are obtained. A
random assignment is T-ordinally fair if each favorite object has to be assigned with
equal probabilities to agents preferring it as the first choice, and whenever an agent
is assigned with positive probability some object that is not a favorite by any one of
the agents then his surplus at this object is no greater than that of any other agent
at the same object. On the other hand, a random assignment is T-non-wasteful if
each one of the favorite alternatives are fully assigned to those agents preferring it
as their first choice, and the surplus of no agent at any object can be raised through
the use of an unassigned probability share of some object.
Why not R2? Naturally this is a relevant follow-up question. That is why
not allow agents to have two reservations, not just one. We prove that doing so
eliminates weak strategyproofness a key property that we do not wish to sacrifice.
A recent and independent study, Featherstone (2011), was brought to our at-
tention when the final draft of this paper was being prepared.30 It deserves special
emphasis. We should point out that that study is also concerned with aggregate
efficiency (which it refers to as the rank efficiency) and some important parts of
our results involving the analysis of aggregate efficiency are common. On the other
hand, the two papers differ extensively after developing this efficiency notion. We
restrict attention to the identification and characterization of a tangible weakly
strategyproof and ordinally efficient mechanism with better aggregate efficiency per-
formances than the PS mechanism (while not completely giving up envy–freeness).
On the other hand, Featherstone (2011) analyzes and characterizes aggregate effi-
cient mechanisms (at the expense of weak strategyproofness) and concentrates on
special cases given by low information environments, like the ones given in Roth and
Rothblum (1999). Moreover, an empirical analysis about costs of strategyproofness
29. The surplus of an agent in a random allotment for a given object is the cumu-
lative probability that he is assigned an alternative at least as good as the current
one.
30. We thank Umut Mert Dur in that regard.
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is considered and it is established that “it would be a mistake to not at least consider
using a rank efficient mechanism” even at the expense of strategyproofness.
2.3 The Model
Let A be a finite set of indivisible objects and N = {1, 2, ..., n} be a finite set of
agents, with the requirement that |A| ≥ |N |. A random assignment (alternatively,
an allocation) P = [pia]i∈N,a∈A is a matrix where pia ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability
of agent i being allocated an object a.
∑
a∈A pia = 1 and
∑
i∈N pia ≤ 1. Let the set
of all random assignments be denoted by P . On the other hand, a preference profile
is denoted with ≡ (i)i∈N , where i is the strict preference relation of agent i
on A. Let i denote the weak preference relation induced by i. We assume that
preferences are linear orders, i.e., for all a, b ∈ A, a i b ⇔ a = b or a i b. We
denote the set of all such preference relations of agent i by Πi, and the set of all
such preference profiles by Π. For any  in Π, we define favorite alternatives as
F () = {a ∈ A|∃i ∈ N : a i b,∀b ∈ A}. For all agents i ∈ N , define most preferred
alternative of agent i as Fi() = {a ∈ A|a i b,∀b ∈ A} and define the set of agents
preferring alternative a as their first choices, Fa() = {i ∈ N |a i b,∀b ∈ A}. Given
a preference profile in Π, define the weak upper contour set of agent i ∈ N at object
a ∈ A by U(a,i) = {b ∈ A : b i a} and given P ∈ P let U(a, P,i) =
∑
bia Pib
denote the surplus of agent i at a under P , i.e. the probability that i is assigned an
object at least as good as a under Pi.
Next, we define ex-ante efficiency and ex-post efficiency : Let (ui)i∈N be a profile
of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, where each individual one is a real
valued function on A and the corresponding preferences over P is obtained by the
comparison of expected utilities where ui(Pi) =
∑
a∈A piaui(a). Given a profile of
preferences  in Π and an associated profile of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities
u = (ui)i∈N , we say that a random assignment P ∈ P is (1) ex-ante efficient at u if
and only if P is Pareto optimal in P at u; and (2) ex-post efficient at  whenever
its decomposition involves only efficient deterministic assignments.
Given two allocations P and Q, we say that P stochastically dominates Q for
agent i, and denote it by Pi sdi Qi, if and only if U(a, Pi,i) ≥ U(a,Qi,i) for
all a ∈ A. Moreover, P stochastically dominates Q if and only if Pi sdi Qi for all
i ∈ N . Furthermore, given preference profile  in Π, a random assignment P ∈ P
is said to be ordinally efficient if and only if for any given P ′ ∈ P , P ′ sd P implies
P ′ = P .
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We say that an allocation P ∈ P is envy-free for a given preference profile  if
and only if we have that for all i, j ∈ N , Pi sdi Pj. Moreover, it is weakly envy-free
if and only if Pj sdi Pi implies Pi = Pj.
A mechanism is a function mapping preference profiles to random assignments.
Given a mechanism ϕ : Π→ P , we say ϕ is strategy-proof if for all  in Π and for
all i ∈ N we have ϕi() sdi ϕi(′i,−i) for all ′i in Πi. Furthermore, ϕ is weakly
strategy-proof if for all  in Π and for all i ∈ N , ϕi(′i,−i) sdi ϕi() implies
ϕi(′i,−i) = ϕi() for all ′i in Πi.
Next we introduce aggregate efficiency : For a given preference profile  in Π,
define rik as the most preferred k objects in A by agent i ∈ N . Moreover, for
a given random assignment P ∈ P let an aggregate efficiency vector be defined
by wP = (wP1 , ..., w
P
|A|) in R|A| where wPk =
∑
i∈N
∑
a∈rik Pia. Consequently, given a
preference profile in Π, we say that a random assignment P aggregate stochastically
dominates Q, if wP ≥ wQ, and we denote this by P asd Q. Finally, given a
preference profile in Π, a random assignment P ∈ P is aggregate efficient whenever
P ′ asd P for some P ′ ∈ P implies wP = wP ′ .
Moreover, aggregate stochastic domination between mechanisms is defined as
follows: A mechanism ϕ : Π→ P aggregate stochastically dominates another mech-
anism ϕ′ : Π→ P , if for all  in Π we have ϕ′() asd ϕ() implies wϕ′() = wϕ(),
and there exist ∗ such that ϕ(∗) asd ϕ′(∗) and wϕ′(∗) 6= wϕ(∗).
2.4 Aggregate Efficiency and Impossibility Results
Due to BM it is well known that ex-ante efficiency implies ordinal efficiency
which in turn implies ex-post efficiency, demanding that every possible realization
of the random assignment has to be an efficient deterministic assignment. On the
other hand, McLennan (2002) establishes that if a random assignment is ordinally
efficient then there exists a profile of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities for which
this random assignment is ex-ante efficient.
After handling the existence question in Theorem 12, we prove that every ag-
gregate efficient random assignment has to be ordinally efficient, (hence, ex-post
efficient), and there are ordinally efficient random assignments that are not aggre-
gate efficient (Theorem 14). Moreover, we also show that an aggregate efficient
random assignment resolves only into aggregate efficient deterministic assignments
(Theorem 13). Therefore, combining these two results formally establishes that
every possible realization of an aggregate efficient random assignment can involve
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only an aggregate efficient deterministic assignment. While aggregate efficiency has
these useful properties, an interesting finding emerges when considering the relation
of ex-ante efficiency with aggregate efficiency: Ex-ante efficiency does not imply
aggregate efficiency (Theorem 15). On the other hand, due to Theorem 14 and
McLennan (2002), we know that if a random assignment is aggregate efficient then
there exists a profile of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities for which this random
assignment is ex-ante efficient.
Next, we consider the relation between strategyproofness and aggregate effi-
ciency. Zhou (1990) proves Gale’s conjecture about the incompatibility of Pareto effi-
ciency and strategyproofness in one–sided deterministic matching problems: “When
there are n objects to be assigned to n agents, for n ≥ 3, there exits no mechanism
that satisfies symmetry (equal treatment of equals), Pareto optimality, and strate-
gyproofness.” Moreover, BM shows that this incompatibility arises in random allo-
cation problems as a tradeoff between ordinal efficiency and strategyproofness: They
show that there is no mechanism treating equals equally which satisfies ordinal effi-
ciency and strategyproofness. We, therefore, ask whether or not similar conclusions
hold with the stronger efficiency concept introduced in the current study. Indeed,
in Theorem 17 we show that the inevitable trade–off between efficiency and strat-
egyproofness concepts (when attention is restricted to mechanisms treating equals
equally) prevails: Aggregate efficiency and weak–strategy proofness are incompat-
ible with the equal treatment property. In other words, when one strengthens the
efficiency notion and weakens the strategyproofness concept, there are no changes
regarding this impossibility result. This, in turn, points to an updated version of
the classic trade–off between efficiency and strategyproofness, this time between
aggregate efficiency and weak strategyproofness. Moreover, Theorem 18 points to
another impossibility: Aggregate efficiency and the property of weak envy-free are
not compatible.
The existence of aggregate efficient random assignments follows from the Theo-
rem 12 which is presented without a proof. This is because the result is an immediate
consequence of the acyclicity of the order on random assignments defined in R|A|
and compactness of P , the set of all random assignments on A.
Theorem 12 Given any preference profile  in Π, there exist an aggregate efficient
random assignment P in P.
Theorem 12 also establishes the existence of an aggregate efficient mechanism:
For every given preference structure, using Theorem 12 one can simply construct an
aggregate efficient mechanism by picking an aggregate efficient allocation for each
possible preference structure.
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The following 3 Theorems present the results discussed above.
Theorem 13 An aggregate efficient random assignment can only be decomposed
into aggregate efficient permutation matrices.
Proof. The Von-Neumann Birkhoff Theorem tells us that a matrix is identifying a
random assignment if and only if it can be written as a convex combination of per-
mutation matrices. Therefore, any aggregate efficient random assignment P ∈ P ,
can be written as a convex combination of permutation matrices (P1, P2, ..., Pk), as
P =
∑k
`=1 λ`P`. We claim that all these permutation matrices have to be aggre-
gate efficient. Suppose not, then there exists a permutation matrix Pc for some
c ∈ {1, 2, ..., k} that is not aggregate efficient; so, P ′c aggregated stochastically dom-
inates Pc. Hence, P
′ defined through (P1, P2, ..., P ′c, ..., Pk) as the following convex
combination λcP
′
c +
∑
6`=c λ`P` aggregate stochastically dominates P . Consequently,
P is not aggregate efficient.
Theorem 14 The set of aggregate efficient random assignments is a subset of the
set of ordinally efficient random assignments. Moreover, this containment relation
may be strict.
Proof. For any P ∈ P that is not ordinally efficient, it must be that there exists
P ′ 6= P and i ∈ N such that Pi 6= P ′i and P ′i sdi Pi, which is if and only if∑
bia P
′
ib ≥
∑
bia Pib for all a ∈ A and there exists a′ ∈ A such that this inequality
holds strictly. Hence,
∑
a∈rjk P
′
ja ≥
∑
a∈rjk Pja, for all k ≤ |A| and for all j ∈ N ,
yet there exists m ≤ |A| such that this inequality holds strictly for agent i ∈ N ,
because otherwise P ′ = P . Therefore,
∑
j∈N
∑
a∈rjk P
′
ja ≥
∑
j∈N
∑
a∈rjk Pja for all
k and this inequality holds strictly for k = m. Hence, P ′ aggregated stochastically
dominates P , implying that P is not aggregate efficient.
In order to see the second part, consider the example supplied both in the intro-
duction and as 22 in the proof of Theorem 21.
Theorem 15 Given any preference profile  in Π and associated von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility profile u = (ui)i∈N , an ex-ante efficient random assignment does
not need to be aggregate efficient. Moreover, for every aggregate efficient random
assignment P in P, there exists a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility profile u˜ =
(u˜i)i∈N such that P is ex-ante efficient at u˜.
Proof. The first part is due to the following example which is a cardinal version of
the example supplied both in section and as Example 22 in the proof of Theorem
21:
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W () a b c d
1 0.5 0 0.5 0
2 0.5 0 0.5 0
3 0 1 0 0
4 0 0 0 1
W (′) a b c d
1 0.5 0 0.5 0
2 0.5 0 0.5 0
3 0 0.5 0 0.5
4 0 0.5 0 0.5
TABLE III
Aggregate efficient allocations for  and ′.
Example 16 Let N = {1, 2, 3}, A = {a, b, c} and a 1 b 1 c, a 2 b 2 c,
b 3 a 3 c. Let ui = (uia, uib, uic) be the vector which denotes the utilities of agent
i ∈ {1, 2, 3} from getting objects {a, b, c} respectively. Suppose u1 = u2 = (10, 8, 1),
and u3 = (8, 10, 6).
Then any aggregate efficient allocation P can be denoted by a number x ∈ [0, 1]
such that P1() = (x, 0, 1− x), P2() = (1− x, 0, x) and P3() = (0, 1, 0). So, the
sum of expected utilities of agents under any aggregate efficient allocation is equal
to 21. However, let R be an allocation such that R1 = (1, 0, 0), R2 = (0, 1, 0) and
R3 = (0, 0, 1). Then, sum of expected utilities of agents under R is equal to 24.
The second part of the Theorem follows from Theorem 14 and McLennan (2002).
The following Theorem establishes the incompatibility of aggregate efficiency
with weak strategyproofness and equal treatment of equals:
Theorem 17 Suppose that N ≥ 4. Then, there is no mechanism treating equals
equally and satisfies aggregate efficiency and weak strategyproofness.
Proof. Consider the following example: N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and A = {a, b, c, d} where
a i c i b i d, for i = 1, 2, and b 3 c 3 d 3 a and b 4 d 4 c 4 a. The
unique aggregate efficient allocation satisfying the equal treatment property is given
in first table in table III.
Now, consider ′ where ′i=i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and ′4=3. That is to say, ′ is
preference structure constructed with the deviation of fourth agent to third agents’
preferences. Then a mechanism satisfying aggregate efficiency and equal treatment
of equals should assign the allocation on the right. This deviation is profitable for
player 4 because it results in an ordinally better allocation for the fourth agent when
compared with stating his true preference.
This example can be embedded into other problems with more than four agents
as follows: Suppose there are n agents and n objects. Let, first four agents’ are called
old agents and their first four preferences are exactly like the above example and
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the order of preferences of other objects are not important for old agents. Also, any
new object is declared as a first choice by exactly one new agent. Then a mechanism
satisfying welfare efficiency and equal treatment of equals should assign old agents
exactly the allocation given above and assign each new agent his most preferred
object. Hence, the same deviation is still profitable for fourth agent as in example
above.
In the following Theorem, we establish that aggregate efficiency and the property
of weak envy-free are not compatible without the need to employ the equal treatment
property:
Theorem 18 Suppose that N ≥ 4. Then, there is no mechanism satisfying aggre-
gate efficiency and weak envy-freeness.
Proof. Consider the example in the proof of Theorem 17 and notice that any
aggregate efficient mechanism must assign object b to the third agent and object d
to the fourth. Then clearly forth agent strictly envies the third. As discussed in the
proof of Theorem 17, this example can be generalized to other problems with more
agents and more alternatives.
2.5 The R1 Mechanism
Theorem 17 tells us that there is no mechanism treating equals equally and satisfying
weak strategyproofness and aggregate efficiency. On the other hand, BM shows that
the PS mechanism satisfies ordinal efficiency and weak strategyproofness and equal
treatment of equals (while it is shown not to be strategyproof). Therefore, the PS
mechanism cannot satisfy aggregate efficiency whenever N ≥ 4.
Following the same of thinking as in BM, it is a plausible question to ask whether
or not the PS mechanism can be beaten on grounds of aggregate efficiency when
one restricts attention to weakly strategyproof mechanisms treating equals equally.
It turns out that the answer to this question is positive.
Theorems 20 and 21 establish that there exists a mechanism, the R1, treating
equals equally and satisfying weak strategyproofness while displaying a better per-
formance with respect to aggregate efficiency. Moreover, this mechanism is weakly
envy-free.
The R1 mechanism is defined via the following algorithm: Given a problem
(, A), each alternative a ∈ A is interpreted as infinitely divisible with total supply
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of 1 unit. Agents can eat one object at a time and the eating speed values of
agents are all equal. On the other hand, a distinct feature is that each agent has a
reservation right for his most preferred object. That is, each agent i ∈ N starts to eat
away from Fi() until it is depleted. When agent i’s best alternative is exhausted,
then he starts to eat from their most preferred object in A \F (), until that one is
also depleted. Then, he continues with the next best among the nondepleted ones
in A \ F (). That is, once F () is depleted, the R1 mechanism behaves exactly as
the PS mechanism. The algorithm terminates when each agent has eaten exactly 1
total unit of objects. The allocation of an agent i by R1 is then given by the amount
of each object he has eaten until the algorithm terminates. Let R1() ∈ P denote
the random assignment obtained as a result of R1 for a preference profile given by
 in Π.
A natural follow-up questions is about why we are not allowing agents to have
two reservations. In fact, why not R2? The interesting finding is that, doing so
eliminates weak strategyproofness. Hence, clearly this provides sufficiently strong
reasons for the dismissal of the R2 mechanisms. The formal execution is in Appendix
??.
A further interesting and motivating observation emerges when one considers
the characterization of the R1 mechanism: It is nothing but the PS mechanism
modified to satisfy a principle set forth by the Turkish parliament. This principle,
which we call condition T is outlined in the Official Journal of Republic of Turkey
16 November 1996 issue number 22819, and it decrees that: (1) whenever a new
doctor (an agent) is the only one ranking a place of duty (an alternative) as the
highest, then he is allocated that particular place of duty; and (2) if there are more
than one new doctors ranking a particular place of duty as their highest, then one
of them is selected with a random draw.
In a recent and important study, Hashimoto, Hirata, Kesten, Kurino, and Unver
(forthcoming) provides a full characterization for PS mechanism by using only two
axioms, one related to fairness and the other one to efficiency. These are namely
ordinal fairness and non-wastefulness. Ordinal fairness follows “whenever an agent
is assigned some object with positive probability, his surplus at this object is no
greater than that of any other agent at the same object”; and non-wastefulness
whenever “the surplus of no agent at any object can be raised through the use of
an unassigned probability share of some object”.
Theorem 19 of the current study provides a full characterization of the R1 mecha-
nism which employs versions of these axioms modified to make them satisfy condition
T. These axioms are T-ordinal fairness and T-non-wastefulness:
33
Definition 2 Given  in Π, a random assignment P ∈ P is T-non-wasteful at 
if
∑
i∈Fa() Pi,a = 1 for all a ∈ F (); and, for all i ∈ N and for all a ∈ A such that
Pi,a > 0 we have
∑
j∈N Pj,b = 1 for all b ∈ A with b i a.
Definition 3 Given  in Π, a random assignment P ∈ P is T-ordinally fair at
 if a = Fi() with i ∈ N and a ∈ A implies U(a, P,i) ≤ U(a, P,j) for all
j ∈ Fa(), and for all i, j ∈ N and for all alternatives a 6= Fi() with Pi,a > 0 it
must be that U(a, P,i)) ≤ U(a, P,j).
The next Theorem the proof of which is deferred to the Appendix, renders a full
characterization of the R1 mechanism:
Theorem 19 A mechanism is T-ordinally fair and T-non-wasteful if and only if it
is R1.
In what follows, we provide some important properties of the R1 mechanism. In
fact, it is useful to point out that under the R1 mechanism any alternative a ∈ F ()
will be allocated only to agents in Fa(), and with equal probabilities. That is, the
R1 mechanism obeys condition T while satisfying the important properties of weak
strategyproofness, ordinal efficiency, and weak envy-freeness. These are stated in
the following Theorem the proof of which is in the Appendix.
Theorem 20 R1 mechanism satisfies condition T, weak strategyproofness, ordi-
nally efficency and weak envy-freeness.
It is important to emphasize that due to Theorem 17 we know that there exists
no mechanism treating equals equally and satisfying aggregate efficiency and weak
strategyproofness. Moreover, due to Theorem 20 we know that the R1 mechanism
is weak strategyproof and ordinally efficient, while being weakly envy-free (which
clearly implies the equal treatment property). Therefore, it is not aggregate effi-
cient. On the other hand, recalling that the PS mechanism is weakly strategyproof
and ordinally efficient and envy-free, one may wonder whether or not the “slack”
created by relaxing envy-freeness to weak envy-freeness is useful for some other prop-
erty. The answer is affirmative, and the property that gets strengthened concerns
aggregate efficiency. To be precise, the R1 mechanism satisfies condition T, and
moreover, we show that the R1 mechanism aggregate stochastically dominates the
PS mechanism.
Theorem 21 The R1 mechanism aggregate stochastic dominates the probabilistic
serial mechanism.
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Proof. We prove this Theorem by showing that there is no preference profile where
PS() asd R1() and wPS() 6= wR1(), where PS : Π → P denotes the PS
mechanism. Moreover, using the example given in the introduction we establish
that there exists ˜ ∈ Π with R1(˜) asd PS(˜) and wPS(˜) 6= wR1(˜).
In order to show that there does not exist a preference profile  in Π such
that PS() asd R1() and wPS() 6= wR1(), suppose (for a contradiction) that
there exists a ∗ for which PS(∗) asd R1(∗). By the definition of aggregate
stochastic domination, there should be a strict difference between the allocations,
therefore PS(∗) 6= R1(∗). Note that if PS(∗)ia = R1(∗)ia for all a ∈ F (∗),
then PS(∗) = R1(∗), since the R1 algorithm proceeds exactly the same as PS
after the favorite alternatives are allocated (i.e. R1 behaves the same as PS for
all a /∈ F (∗)). Therefore, there exist i ∈ N and a = Fi(∗) such that PS(∗
)ia 6= R1(∗)ia. Hence, by the defining property of R1, PS(∗)ia 6= R1(∗)ia
implies R1(∗)iFi(∗) > PS(∗)iFi(∗) (since the reservation right can lead only to
an increase in the allocation of a good to an agent who prefers it as his favorite
object), so
∑N
i=1 PS(∗)i,Fi(∗) <
∑N
i=1R1(∗)i,Fi(∗) and PS(∗) 6asd R1(∗),
delivering the desired contradiction.
Example 22 Let N = {1, 2, 3}, A = {a, b, c} and a 1 b 1 c, a 2 b 2 c,
b 3 a 3 c. Then R11() = R12() = [1/2, 0, 1/2] and R13() = [1, 0, 0].
Where as PS1() = PS2() = [1/2, 1/6, 1/3] and PS3() = [2/3, 0, 1/3]. When we
compare these two allocation, R1 allocates 2 alternatives to agents viewing them as
the first choice preferences and 1 alternative to an agent ranking it the least while
PS distributes one to each. That is to say, wR1() = (2, 2, 3) and wPS() = (1, 2, 3).
This finishes the proof of Theorem 21.
2.6 Appendix: Proofs
2.6.1 Proof of Theorem 19
First, we propose an eating algorithm that can be used for any allocation at any
preference structure  in Π, which will be key to the proof.
Fix a preference structure . Then any allocation P () can be simulated by an
eating function defined as follows:
Think each object as an infinitely divisible good with a quota 1. Each agent
eats away from his most preferred object among the objects that are assigned him
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with a positive probability. When an agent eats his assigned probability from some
object, he starts to eat away from his next preferred object that is assigned him
with a positive probability. Each agent eats with a same speed until the algorithm
ends at time 1 when each agent has eaten exactly 1 total unit of objects. Therefore
we define the eating function f : [0, 1) × N → A such that for all fP (t, i) = {a ∈
U(t)|a i b, ∀b ∈ U(t)} where U(t) = {a ∈ A : U(a, P,i) > t}. This function
identifies the object that agent i eats at time t.
Proof. First we will show that there exist an allocation which satisfies T-ordinal
fairness and aggregate non-wastefulness for any preference . In particular, we will
show that it is R1().
For all a ∈ F (), R1()ia = 1/|Fa()| for all i ∈ Fa(). Therefore it must be
that
∑
i∈Fa() R1()ia = 1 for all a ∈ F (). Then, let i be any player in N and
a, b be any objects in A such that Pi,a > 0 and b i a. Then, from the ordinal
efficiency of R1() (due to Theorem 20), ∑j∈N Pj,b = 1. Hence, R1() is aggregate
non-wasteful.
For all i ∈ N and a ∈ A such that a = Fi(), we have U(a, P,i) ≤ U(a, P,j
) for all j ∈ Fa() since R1()ja = R1()ia = 1/|Fa()| (by aggregate non-
wastefulness of R1()). Now, we have to show that for each object a /∈ F () and
all i, j ∈ N with Pia > 0 , we have U(a, P,i) ≤ U(a, P,j). Suppose not, then
there exists t∗ ∈ [0, U(a, P,i)) such that a j fR1 (t∗, j). However, this means that
agent j has eaten from an object less preferred to a while the unfavorite object a is
not exhausted, contradicting with R1 mechanism. Therefore R1() is T-ordinally
fair.
We have shown that there exists an aggregate non-wasteful and T-ordinally fair
allocation for every preference structure. Now we will show that there is no other
allocation than R1 satisfying these two properties by showing that if there is an
allocation satisfying these properties, it should be characterized by the same eating
function with R1.
Fix a preference profile , and let P ∈ P be any T-ordinally fair and aggregate
non-wasteful allocation at . We will show that fP (t, i) = fR1 (t, i) for all t ∈ [0, 1)
and i ∈ N . Suppose not, then there exists a time, say t∗, where the eating functions
proceed same until t∗, but starts to differ at t∗. Formally, t∗ = max{t ∈ [0, 1) :
fP (t
′, i) = fR1 (t
′, i) for all t′ < t for all i ∈ N}. Then there exist an agent i such
that fP (t
∗, i) 6= fR1 (t∗, i). Let fR1 (t∗, i) = a and fP (t∗, i) = b.
Aggregate non-wastefulness restricts that all favorite goods has to be assigned
completely,
∑
i∈Fa() Pia = 1, and must be assigned equally among the agents who
prefers that object as his favorite good, PiFi() = 1/|FFi()()| follows from the
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definition of T-ordinal fairness. Therefore, the eating functions should be exactly
same for favorite goods, hence a and b cannot be in F (). Note that, the eating
functions are same until t∗, therefore with the fact that b is not exhausted at t∗
and agent i eats from a in R1 at t∗ where b /∈ F (), a i b. Then, there are two
cases to consider: (i) There exist j ∈ N and t > t∗ such that fP (t, j) = a. Then
U(a, P,j) ≥ t > t∗ ≥ U(a, P,i) contradicting with T-ordinal fairness of P , since
a /∈ F () and Pja > 0. (ii) Otherwise,
∑
k∈N Pka <
∑
k∈N R1ka = 1 and Pib > 0
contradicts with aggregate non-wastefulness of P .
Therefore there exist not such t∗ ∈ [0, 1) and hence fP (t, i) = fR1 (t, i) for all
t ∈ [0, 1) implying P = R1().
2.6.2 Proof of Theorem 20
In the eating algorithm given in proof of Theorem 19, define t(a) to be time at
which object a is exhausted at preference ∈ Π (under R1 mechanism), i.e.
t(a) =
sup{t ∈ [0, 1) : fR1 (t, i) = a} if
∑
iR1()ia = 1
+∞ otherwise.
Claim 23 R1 mechanism satisfies ordinal efficiency.
Proof. Fix a preference profile . Suppose R1() is not ordinally efficient. Then
there exists an allocation Q 6= R1() such that Q sd R1(). First of all, we
claim that there do not exist an agent i ∈ N and objects a, b ∈ A such that
R1()ib > 0 and a i b,
∑
j∈N R1()ja < 1. If otherwise, a cannot be in F () since
R1 mechanism assigns favourable objects completely. On the other hand, object a
must be in F () since agent i starts to eat away from object b when object a is
available in the simultaneous eating algorithm for R1 mechanism. End of claim.
Q sd R1() and Q 6= R1() implies that there exist an agent i1 ∈ N such that
Qi1 sdi1 R1()i1 and Qi1 6= R1()i1 . Then, there are objects a1, a2 ∈ A such that
a2 i1 a1 and Qi1a2 > R1()i1a2 and Qi1a1 < R1()i1a1 . Since,
∑
j∈N R1()ja2 = 1,
there exist an agent i2 6= i1 such that Qi2a2 < R1()i2a2 . Since Qi2 sd R1()i2 and
Qi2a2 < R1()i2a2 , then there exist an object a3 ∈ A such that Qi2a3 > R1()i2a3 .
Hence, we can successively define sets {i1, i2, .., in} and {a1, a2, .., an, an+1} where
an+1 = am for some m < n.
Now consider the agents (im, im+1, ..., in) and objects (am, am+1, ..., an+1) such
that ak+1 ik ak for every m ≤ k ≤ n and an+1 = am. Any object ak is not
in F (), since ak+1 ik ak and R1()ikak > 0. Then t(ak) > t(ak+1) for all
m ≤ k ≤ n, since object ak+1 must be unavailable when agent ik eats away from
37
object ak. Therefore t
(am) > t(am+1) > ... > t(an+1) = t(am). Contradiction.
Claim 24 R1 mechanism satisfies weak strategy proofness.
Proof. Fix a preference structure  and take an agent i ∈ N and let i: a1  a2 
...  an. Suppose there exists a deviation ′i such that R1i(′) sdi R1i(), where
′= (′i,−i). We will show that R1i() = R1i(′) with induction, first by showing
that for any given deviation, R1() and R1(′) coincides on the interval [0, t(a1))
in the basis step. Then we will assume that for any am such that 1 ≤ m < n
and R1()iam > 0, eating algorithms coincide on the interval [0, t(am)) such that
t(am) < 1. Set fR1 (t
(am), i) = al. We will prove that eating algorithms coincide on
the interval [0,min(t(al), 1)), which completes this proof in an inductive manner.
Basis: Note that if R1()ia1 = 1, then it is clear that R1() = R1i(′). If R1(
)ia1 < 1, then there exist j ∈ N \ {i} such that j ∈ Fa1(). So if i /∈ Fa1(′), then
R1(′)ia1 = 0 < R1()ia1 . Contradiction. Hence, i cannot misreport his favorite
object, and so Fj(′) = Fj() for all j ∈ N . So, the eating algorithms coincide on
the interval [0, t(a1)).
Inductive Step: Suppose for some am such that 1 ≤ m < n and R1()iam > 0,
eating algorithms coincide on the interval [0, t(am)) such that t(am) < 1. Set
fR1 (t
(am), i) = al, and note that al  b for all b such that b /∈ F () and
t(b) > t(am), that is to say al is the most preferred object for agent i among
the available ones at t(am). We will prove that eating algorithms coincide on the
interval [0,min{t(al), 1}).
Note that, we assumed that R1i(′) sdi R1i(), so it must be true that R1(
)ial ≤ R1(′)ial and therefore min{t(al), 1} ≤ min{t′(al), 1}. If there is no agent
j ∈ N \ {i} and time t′, t(am) ≤ t′ < t(al) such that fR1 (t′, j) = al, then the
surplus of agent i at object al is equal to 1, hence R1()i = R1(′)i. So, there exist
an agent j ∈ N \ {i}, and a time t′ ∈ [t(am), t(al)) such that fR1 (t′, j) = al.
If there is no agent j, j 6= i and a time t′ ∈ [t(am), t(al)) such that fR1 (t′, j) =
al and f
R1
′ (t
′, j) = b, where b 6= al, then there are two cases,
(i) if t(al) < 1, we claim t
′
(al) = t
(al). First note that t
′
(al) < t
(al),
contradicts with the assumption R1i(′) sdi R1i(). Also, if t′(al) > t(al), then
for all j ∈ N \ {i} such that R1()jal > 0, R1(′)jal > R1()jal , implying R1(′
)ial < R1()ial and hence R1i(′) 6sd R1i(). Contradiction. So, t′(al) = t(al)
and hence fR1 (t, i) = f
R1
′ (t
′, i) = al for all t′ such that t(am) ≤ t′ < t(al) implying
that eating algorithms coincide on the interval [0,min{t(al), 1}).
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(ii) if t(al) ≥ 1, then
∑
bal R1()ib = 1. Hence R1(′) sd R1() im-
plies
∑
bal R1(′)ib = 1. Therefore, fR1 (t, i) = fR1′ (t′, i) = al for all t′ such
that t(am) ≤ t′ < 1 implying that eating algorithms coincide on the interval
[0,min{t(al), 1}).
We have shown that there exist an agent j ∈ N\{i} and a time t′ ∈ [t(am), t(al))
such that fR1 (t
′, j) = al and fR1′ (t
′, j) = b, where b 6= al. Then, b j al and note
that b and al cannot be in either F () or F (′). Hence b is not available at t′
under  but available under ′, so t(b) < t′(b). Let G be the set of objects such
that g 6= al such that t(g) < t′(g). Note that G is nonempty (b is in G) and let
y be the object in G with minimal t(y). Note that t(am) ≤ t(y) < t(al), since
the algorithm proceeds same until t(am) and t(y) ≤ t(b) from the definition of
y and t(b) < t(al) from b j al and R1()jal > 0.
Suppose there exist an agent k and a time t′, t′ < t(y) such that fR1 (t
′, k) = y
and fR1′ (t
′, k) = c, where c 6= y. ( Otherwise, verify that t(y) = t′(y). Contradic-
tion.) Note that k 6= i since agent i eats object al for all t′, t(am) ≤ t′ < t(al)
at  since t(y) < t(al).Then, c k y and t(c) < t′ < t(y). Also, t(c) < t′(c)
since c k y and fR1 (t′, k) = y and fR1′ (t′, k) = c. Then c must be the minimal in
G. A contradiction.
Therefore there cannot be any agent starting to eat from any other object be-
tween t(am) and t(al), implying that each algorithm proceed same until min{t(al), 1}.
Claim 25 R1 mechanism satisfies weak envy-freeness.
Proof. Fix a preference structure . Take i, j ∈ N such that R1()j sdi R1()i,
we will show that R1()j = R1()i. If Fi() 6= Fj(), then R1()jFi() = 0 <
R1()iFi(). A contradiction. So, fR1 (t′, i) = fR1 (t′, j) = Fi() for all t′ such that
0 ≤ t′ < t(Fi()).
Suppose fR1 (t
′, i) = fR1 (t
′, j) for all t′,0 ≤ t′ < t(a) < 1 for some object
a ∈ A with R1()ia > 0. Then let fR1 (t(a), i) = b and fR1 (t(a), j) = c, where
b 6= c. Note that b, c /∈ F (). Then b i c and fR1 (t′, i) = b for all t′ such that
t(a) ≤ t′ < min(1, t(b)). Hence, clearly R1()ib > R1()jb and so
∑
mibR1(
)im >
∑
mibR1()jm. A contradiction. Hence we can conclude that b and c should
be the same good, inductively implying that R1()i = R1()j
2.7 Appendix: R2 Mechanism
39
We can define R2 mechanism as follows:
A plausible extension of R1 mechanism is to give reservation right to agents not
only for their top choice but also to their second most preferred object. Similar to the
reservation right for top choice in R1 mechanism, an agent can put reservation to an
object if he ranks that object as his second choice in R2 mechanism. This reservation
right can be introduced in various ways but we will prefer to define it as general as
possible as follows: An agent can put reservation on his second choice as much as
his remaining quota if he is the first person who eat from that object through the
eating algorithm. We leave the following questions about the reservation rights in R2
mechanism open, since our counter example covers all possible versions of reservation
rights for the second most preferred object: ”Can an agent put reservation when
he is not the first one that eats from an object even he ranks that object as his
second choice?” or ”what happens if there are more than one agent who can put
reservation?” or ”Can a group of agents put reservation, when another group is
eating from that object?”.
Note that, we can extend R1 algorithm by giving two reservation rights to agents
where they will put these reservations to not only their top two choices, but the first
two goods they eat through the algorithm. Again, the following example will show
that this mechanism is also not weak strategy proof.
Example 26 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and A = {a, b, c, d, e}, and the preferences are
given by a 1 b 1 c 1 d 1 e, a 2 c 2 b 2 d 2 e, a 3 c 3 d 3 e 3 b and
3=4=5.
All possible version of R2 allocation is given by:
N/A a b c d e
1 1/5 4/5 0 0 0
2 1/5 1/5 1/4 1/10 1/4
3 1/5 0 1/4 3/10 1/4
4 1/5 0 1/4 3/10 1/4
5 1/5 0 1/4 3/10 1/4
When the second agent reports his ranking as a ′2 c ′2 d ′2 b ′2 e, the R2
allocation, for all possible versions, for reported preferences is given by:
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N/A a b c d e
1 1/5 4/5 0 0 0
2 1/5 1/5 1/4 1/4 1/10
3 1/5 0 1/4 1/4 3/10
4 1/5 0 1/4 1/4 3/10
5 1/5 0 1/4 1/4 3/10
Therefore, there is a profitable deviation where the second agent gets an allocation
that stochastically dominates his previous allocation in truthful submission.
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CHAPTER 3
INFORMATION ACQUISITION IN TWO-SIDED MATCHING
MARKETS
3.1 Introduction
Centralized university student matching institutions, in Turkey, China and many
other countries, operate essentially as in the Gale–Shapley college admissions model:
Students submit their orderings for university seats they have in mind, universities
order students based on their scores in national exams and secondary school grade
point averages, a stable matching is computed and enforced. A particular criticism
directed at this practice is that, not having the opportunity for any close look at indi-
vidual students beyond what their scores reveal, university orderings disregard much
relevant information, leading in fact to deterioration in pre-university education. A
remedial institution is a matching after two–stage interviewing and preference re-
porting, whereby in the first stage students and university seats are each matched
with a shortlist of, say k, candidates, utilizing a stable multipartner matching pro-
cedure but with the coarse university orderings based on scores. In the second stage,
universities and students are allowed to take a closer look at their potential mates in
the shortlists and submit orderings subsequently. A stable matching µ that assigns
each student to at most one university is then computed and enforced.
We analyze this remedial institution with an NIRMP matching marketplace.
National Intern Resident Matching Program is a similar institution utilized for the
matching of hospitals and doctors in US.
The matching literature generally also assumes agents know their preferences be-
fore entering a match. Therefore there are small number of article which is related to
this study: (Das and Kamenica 2005), (Chakraborty, Citanna, and Ostrovsky 2010),
(Josephson and Shapiro 2008), and (Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela 2009) explore
the role of information acquisition in matching markets in different settings. (Das
and Kamenica 2005) consider sequential learning in the context of dating markets
where universities and students repeatedly go on dates to learn their preferences;
Chakraborty et al. investigate the stability of matching mechanisms with interde-
pendent values over partners; Hoppe et. al examine the effectiveness of signalling in
an assortative matching environment; and Josephson and Shapiro study the role of
adverse selection when firms sequentially interview workers in a decentralized match-
ing process. Although the literature on search seems related since it also explores
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the role of frictions in matching markets, it is quite dissimilar.
In contrast to related literature, the notions of assortative matching will not be an
issue of consideration in this study. The crucial difference is the strategic interview
decisions that creates externalities on interviewers. The only model, which have
similar concerns is (Lee and Schwarz 2009). However, there is a crucial difference:
the importance of homogeneity of ex-ante preferences are not considered in (Lee and
Schwarz 2009). Hence, none of the articles have substantial intersection with this
study.
3.2 Setup and Definitions
We consider an NIRMP Matching Marketplace consisting of an ordered set of
doctors D and hospitals H. Each doctor dk ∈ D has a strict ranking Rk over
hospitals and in addition a quality qk, which can take two values 1 or 0 with equal
probabilities (1/2, 1/2) and known to any hospital only upon ’interview’. Each
hospital have an ex-ante preference 0 on set of doctors such that dk is preferred
to dk+1 for all dk ∈ D. Note that there is a unique stable matching µ∗ implied by(
(Rj)dj∈D, (R
0)hj∈H
)
. Each hospital hj ∈ H is indexed such that µ∗j(dj) = hj.
We call (qk)dk∈D = q ∈ Q is a quality profile state where Q denotes the set of
each realization. Each hospital has a micro-preference on doctors such that dk is
preferred to dk+1 unless qk = 0 and qk+1 = 1. Each hospital can update his ex-ante
ranking 0 to Ij through interview with Ij ⊂ D, that is dk+1 Ij dk if qk = 0 and
qk+1 = 0, where dk, dk+1 ∈ Ij. Moreover, consistent with micro-preferences, each
hospital hj have the same partial preference ordering  on state-contingent match
M ∈ M = D2|D| , where Mq = dk represents the match for hospital when the state
is q.
In particular, let Mq = dk and M
′
q = dk′ , M  M ′ if and only if for all q ∈ Q,
either (i) k ≤ k′ or (ii) k = k′ + 1 when qk′ = 0 and qk = 1, and for some q ∈ Q
either (i) holds with strict inequality or (ii) holds.
Also, if there exists M,M ′ ∈ M and qˆ, q¯ such that Mq = M ′q for all q 6= qˆ and
q 6= q¯, and Mq = dk+1 where M ′q = dk for q = qˆ or q = q¯, where q¯l = qˆl where l 6= k
and q¯k = 1, qˆk = 0 and qˆk+1 = q¯k+1 = 1, then M M ′. This condition simply says
that dk+1 is not preferred to the dk where qk+1 = 1 and qk is not known.
Moreover, we assume that a hospital is indifferent between to match with dk+1
instead of dk when (qk, qk+1) = (0, 1) and to match with dk′+1 instead of dk′ when
(qk′ , qk′+1) = (0, 1). We call this uniformity assumption.
3.2.1 Interviewing and Preference Reporting Game
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In an NIRMP Matching Marketplace, we consider a two-period Interviewing and
Preference Reporting (IRP) game where the players are hospitals: Each hospital
hj ∈ H, in period 1 chooses a set Ij ⊂ D where |Ij| ≤ 2, namely a set consisting of
at most two doctors, for interviewing and in period 2 - contingent on the information
gathered through interviewing, that is the realization of qIj = (qk)dk∈Ij - submits
a (strict) ranking Rj over the set of all doctors D to the Center who implements
the doctor-optimal matching µ. Thus, for each hospital hj, a strategy is a 2-tuple
(Ij, Rj(qIj)) where Ij is the set of doctors that hj interviews and Rj(qIj) is the
”contingent ranking” of doctors that hj chooses. Naturally, since |Ij| ≤ 2, the
number of states in qIj is less than four, that is Rj(qIj) consists of at most four
rankings.
Moreover, each hospital hj have ordinal preferences  on the matches µj(S), that
is profile of final match for hj when the strategy profile is S. We call µj(S)q = dk,
the final match of hj is dk when the strategy profile of hospitals is S and the realized
state is q. Note that each strategy profile S implies a state-contingent match M .
Moreover each hospital pays the cost of interviewing ε|Ij| where ε is sufficiently
small.
If µ(sj, s−j)  µ(s′j, s−j) for all s−j ∈ S−j, then sj strictly dominates s′j. If sj
strictly dominates each s′j ∈ Sj, then sj is strict dominant strategy for hj. We
call s is a strict dominant equilibrium iff sj is strict dominant strategy for all
hj in H. Note that since  is not complete, the definition is too strict.
We call sj ∈ BRj(s−j) if there exist not s′j ∈ Sj such that µ(s′j, s−j)  µ(sj, s−j).
Hence we define s = (sj)hj∈H , where sj = (Ij, Rj(qIj)) is a Nash Equilibrium, if
there exist not s′j ∈ Sj such that:
µ(s′j, s−j)  µ(s′j, s−j) ∀hj ∈ H.
Note that  is defined on state-contingent match and it is not complete. Hence, the
definition is coarse.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Non-Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Consider an IRP game, Γ∗ in an NIRMP Matching Marketplace with three hos-
pitals and five doctors where Rj below:
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d1 d2 d3 d4 d5
h1 1 1 x x x
h2 x 2 x x x
h3 2 x 1 2 x
h4 x x 2 1 1
h5 x 3 x x x
Proposition 1 There is not Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium of IRP Game, Γ∗.
Proof. Our proof is by contradiction. Suppose there is a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium s = (s1, s2, s3, s4). Let µ be the state-contingent matching at s.
Step 1 : µh1(q) = d2 when (q1, q2) = (0, 1) and µh1(q) = d1 otherwise.
Note that µh1 gives h1 its most preferred doctor in all realizations and therefore
is strictly better than any other state-contingent match. Since h1 is the top-ranked
hospital for both d1 and d2, h1 is able to ensure µh1 by ”interviewing d1, d2 and
reporting its top-ranked doctor as d2 when (q
1, q2) = (0, 1) and as d1 otherwise”.
Since interviewing cost is small, this is, in fact, a strictly dominant strategy for h1.
End of step.
Step 2 : µd2(q) = h1 when (q1, q2) = (0, 1) and µd2(q) = h2 otherwise.
From Step 1, µd2(q) = h1 when (q1, q2) = (0, 1). Suppose to the contrary that
µh2(q) 6= d2 for some q such that (q1, q2) 6= (0, 1). In this case d1 is matched with
h1. Then h2 must have proposed to a doctor other than d1, d2. In fact h2 must
have proposed to and get matched with d3 (for otherwise h2 would be better off by
proposing to and get matched with d2.) So it must be that neither h3 or h4 has
proposed to d3. Moreover, d2 must have been matched with h5. Therefore either
hospital h3 or h4 is matched with d5. Then this hospital must have reported d5
above d3. However this hospital could by reporting d3 above d5 get to propose to
and be matched d3. Contradiction. End of step.
Step 3 : µh3(q) 6= d4 at any q such that (q1, q2) 6= (0, 1).
Suppose to the contrary that there exists a q∗ such that µh3(q
∗) = d4 and
(q1, q2) 6= (0, 1). Then, for q∗, in s3 hospital h3 must have reported d4 above d3
and in s4 hospital h4 must have reported d3 above d4. In fact, µh4(q
∗) = d3 (oth-
erwise µh4(q
∗) = d5, so h4 must have reported d5 above d3 for q∗ in s4, but then
h4 would be better off by putting d3 right above d5 in any contingent ranking of s4
and consequently getting matched with d3. Note that, with this change in strategy,
at any q either the match of h4 do not change or h4 matches with d3 instead of d5.
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Hence there is a better strategy for h4 than s4, contradicting with the fact that s is
a Nash equilibrium.)
Case (i) Suppose, (q∗3, q
∗
4) = (0, 1) and there exists no q
′ such that (q′3, q
′
4) 6= (0, 1)
and µh4(q
′) = d3. In this case, h4 would be better off by only putting d4 right above
in any contingent ranking of s4 thereby getting matched with d4. Note that with
this strategy change, at any q either the match of h4 do not change or h4 matches
with d4 instead of d3 only when (q3, q4) = (0, 1). Hence this deviation from s4 is
profitable, contradicting the fact that s is a Nash equilibrium.
Case (ii) (q∗3, q
∗
4) = (0, 1) and there exists q
′ such that (q′3, q
′
4) 6= (0, 1) and
µh4(q
′) = d3. This is not possible because h3 would be better off by interviewing
d3, d4 and reporting d3 above d4 at q
′ and following same strategy with s3 for other
q. Note that, with this deviation from s3, h3 matches with d3 instead of d4 where
at q′ and contradicting the fact that s is a Nash equilibrium.
From Cases (i) and (ii), it follows that (q∗3, q
∗
4) 6= (0, 1). But, then, h3 would
be better off by only reversing the ranking of d3, d4 in s3 at q
∗ and thereby getting
matched with d3. Contradiction since s is a Nash equilibrium.
Step 4 : h3 does not interview any doctor and µh3(q) = d1 when (q1, q2) = (0, 1)
and µh3(q) = d3 otherwise.
It follows from Step 1 that when (q1, q2) = (0, 1), µh1(q) = d2 and h3 can match
with d1 by ranking d1 as its top-ranked doctor. Moreover, (from Step 2) µh2(q) 6= d2
and (from Step 3) µh3(q) 6= d4 at any q such that (q1, q2) 6= (0, 1). Hence, µh3(q) = d1
when (q1, q2) = (0, 1) and µh3(q) is not equal to d2 or d4 when (q1, q2) 6= (0, 1). Note
that µh3 6= d5 since otherwise h3 would be better of by submitting d3 right above
d5 at any q. Then, µh3(q) = d3 when (q1, q2) 6= (0, 1). Finally, ε-cost of interview
implies h3 does not interview any doctor because of the fact that to not interview
and submitting ex-ante preferences gives µh3(q) at any q. End of step.
Step 5: h4 interviews d4, d5 and µh4(q) = d3 when (q1, q2) = (0, 1) and otherwise
if (q4, q5) = (0, 1) µh4(q) = d5 and µh4(q) = d4 otherwise.
From steps above, µ(h4)(q) is not equal to d1 or d2 at any q. Then µh4(q) is
one of d3, d4, d5. Hence, it is not individually rational for h4 to interview d1, d2.
Then h4 does not rank d5 above d3 at any q in s4. (otherwise, there exist a q such
that in the contingent ranking at q, d5 is above d3 and (q1, q2) = (0, 1) since h4 do
not interview d1 or d2 in s4. Then, at this q, h4 matches d5 instead of d3 and gets
worse off contradicting with s is Nash equilibrium) Then, there are three possible
contingent ”effective” ranking that can be appear in s4 are: d3 above d4 above d5,
d4 above d3 above d5, d3 above d5 above d4. To identify s4, we present a table of
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final match of h4 in each q for each contingent ranking.
q1 q2 (d3, d4, d5) (d4, d3, d5) (d3, d5, d4)
0 1 d3 d4 d3
oth oth d4 d4 d5
Moreover we claim, in s4 hospital h4 interviews with two doctors. For otherwise,
if h4 does not interview in s4: h4 would be better off by deviation from s4 to
interviewing d4, d5 and ranking d5 above d4 when (q4, q5) = (0, 1) and d4 above d5
otherwise. If in s4 hospital h4 interviews only d3, then to interview with d3, d4 and
ranking d4 right above d3 when (q3, q4) = (0, 1) and d3 above d4 otherwise gives
a better stage-contingent match. Similarly, if h4 interviews only d4 in s4, then
interview with d5 or if h4 interviews only with d5 then to interview with d4 and
ranking d5 right above d4 if (q4, q5) = (0, 1) and d4 above d5 otherwise makes h4
better off, contradicting with s is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, h4 interviews two
doctors in s4.
Then in s4, hospital h4 interviews d4, d5 or d3, d4 or d3, d5.
If h4 interviews d3, d5 in s4, then he does not submit (d4, d3, d5) at any (q3, q5)
realization (otherwise, since there exists two q where in one q4 = 1 and in the other
q4 = 0, h4 could be better of by submitting (d3, d4, d5) and consequently matching
with d3 instead of d4. Note that, a hospital prefers to match with d3 when q3 = 0
to the lottery of a match with d4 when q4 = 0 or q4 = 1 has equal probabilities.)
With a similar argument in s4 hospital h4 does not submit (d3, d5, d4) at any (q3, q5)
realization. Hence, at any q he submits (d3, d4, d5). Then ε-cost of interviewing
implies it is not individually rational to interview d3, d5, contradicting with s is a
Nash equilibrium.
If in s4 hospital h4 interviews d3, d4, with a similar argument used above, h4
submits (d4, d3, d5) if (q3, q4) = (0, 1) and (d3, d4, d5) otherwise. Moreover, if h4
interviews d4, d5 in s4, then h4 submits (d3, d5, d4) if (q4, q5) = (0, 1) and (d3, d4, d5)
otherwise. The stage-contingent match of these two strategies are given below:
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q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 (d4, d5) (d3, d4)
0 1 0 0 - d3(−) d3(−)
0 1 0 1 - d3(−) d4(+)
0 1 1 0 - d3(+) d3(+)
0 1 1 1 - d3(+) d3(+)
oth oth - 0 0 d4(−) d4(−)
- 0 1 d5(+) d4(−)
- 1 0 d4(+) d4(+)
- 1 1 d4(+) d4(+)
Then these two strategies only differ when (q1, q2, q3, q4) = (0, 1, 0, 1) or (q1, q2) 6=
(0, 1), (q4, q5) = (0, 1). Note that the probability of first case is p
2(1 − p)2 which is
always less than of the second (1 − p(1 − p))p(1 − p). By uniformity assumption,
when a hospital compares to match with d4 instead of d3 when (q3, q4) = (0, 1) and
to match with d5 instead of d4 when (q4, q5) = (0, 1), he prefers the event with higher
probability. Then, h4 interviews d4, d5 in s4. End of step.
Note that we have shown, in s4 hospital h4 interviews d4, d5 and ranks d3 above
d4 and d5 at any q, and h3 does not interview in s3. However, h3 would be better of
by interviewing d3, d4 and ranking d4 above d3 when (q3, q4) = (0, 1), contradicting
with s is a Nash equilibrium. Hence, there exists no pure strategy equilibrium of
Γ∗.
The non-existence of pure strategy equilibrium result we gave above is robust in
some senses: First, it can be embedded into preference structures where there are
greater number of agents and the result will still hold. Moreover, this result does
not depend on the cardinal utilities of the hospitals, but it is enough to just assume
the essentials of the model about the preferences. Besides, we have assumes that
p = 1/2, but for a greater range of p, the result still holds when it assumed that
dk+1 when qk+1 = 1 is not preferred dk where qk is not known. Here as one can see,
range of p can be much wider.
3.3.2 Two Sided Homogenous Market
To show the preference structure (Rj){j∈D}, we prefer to use a matrix. The entry
k in the di column and hj row indicates hj is the di’s kth most-preferred hopsital.
However, some entries of this matrix will not be meaningful. For instance, it is for
sure that h1 will be matched with either d1 and d2 at the end of the second stage.
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So, the entries of the first row on the ith column where i ≥ 3 are junk. They can be
deleted and the numbers of the matrix can be updated according after this deletion.
Also, the same thing can be done for h2, with the updated preference structure: if
it is guaranteed that any hi will not be matched with dj in the second stage. Then
the entry on the ith row and jth column can be deleted. We call this updation
algorithm, sequential update algorithm.
For example, consider the following matrix on the left, this matrix will turn to
matrix on right after the algorithm.
d1 d2 d3 d4
h1
h2
h3 h3 h3
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3
d1 d2 d3 d4
h1
h2
1 1 X X
2 2 1 1
3 3 2 2
d1 d2 d3 d4
h1
h2
1 1 X X
2 2 1 X
X 3 2 1
From now on, we will use the updated preferences matrices in the examples.
After showing that even with 5 hospitals we can find preference structures where
pure strategy Nash Equilibrium does not exists, and the equilibrium is too hard
to characterize, we will take a close look into a special preference domain, two-
sided homogenous market. This special domain is defined as the domain where the
doctors’ preferences are identical. We will show that in this domain IRP game has a
strictly dominant strategy equilibrium in which each hospital hj interviews di, di+1.
To see this, consider the following preference structure,
d1 d2 .. d4 d5
h1 1 1 .. 1 1
h2 2 2 .. 2 2
.. .. .. .. .. ..
hn n n .. n n
We define ladder property before finding the strict dominant strategy of IRP
Game where doctors’ preferences are identical.
Definition 4 A preference structure represented by the preference matrix P has
ladder property, if the IRP game with this preference structure, has an equilibrium
in which each university hi interviews di, di+1.
Theorem 27 IRP Game has strict dominant equilibrium s∗ when doctors’ prefer-
ences are identical, where in s∗i hospital hi interviews di, di+1.
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Proof. For the equilibrium of IRP game here, we should first look at h1’s strategies.
Since, h1 is the first choice of all doctors, he will interview with d1 and d2 and will
submit his preferences truthfully. Then, if q1 = 0 and q2 = 1, h1 will be matched
with d2 and h2 will be matched with d1, and h2 does not need to make an interview
anyone. Otherwise, h1 will be matched with d1 and h2 will be the first choice of all
students when we exclude h1 and d1 out of the market. Then the same argument
will work for h2 and he will interview d2 and d3. Therefore, this process will make
for hi to interview di and di+1 dominant strategy.
Note that we have shown that there is not pure strategy equilibrium of the IRP
Game for a given preference structure with 5 hospitals and five doctors. Moreover,
this result is robust in the sense that it relies on minimal assumption of the model.
Besides, in the effectively homogenous preference domain, we show strict dominant
strategy equilibrium where an order (the ladder property) is observed. Note that,
with a small change in the preferences of the effectively homogenous domain one
can achieve non-existence of the pure strategy equilibrium. Hence, this shows the
intractability of the IRP Game. That is, a center can find an algorithm to compute
the interview schedule for hospitals only with further assumptions on the preferences.
In a decentralized fashion hospitals may randomize over the interviews. Therefore,
when the interviewing and preference reporting stages are considered together, we
see in some sense the complex and chancy nature of the information acquisition
process.
3.3.3 Effectively Homogenous Market
After defining this property of the equilibrium of the IRP game with two-sided
homogenous market, we characterize the effectively homogenous preference domain,
the domain of preference structures where the equilibrium has ladder property.
Definition 5 A preference structure P is effectively homogenous iff ∀ j > 1,
p(j−1)j < pjj.
Theorem 28 A preference structure has ladder property if and only if it is effec-
tively homogenous.
Proof. We start with finding the university who will interview d1 and d2. With the
observation h1 will either be matched with d1 or d2 in the final matching, no one
but him can acquire any information by interviewing d1 and d2. So, h1 is the one
who had to interview d1 and d2.
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We also should check whether h1 has incentive to interview d1 and d2. Now,
suppose that h1 is not the first choice of d2. Then, d2 will either be matched with
her first choice, or she will be rejected by her first choice. If she is matched with her
first choice, there is no possibility of getting her; if she is rejected by her first choice,
then it means she is not good. In both cases, there is no value of information for h1
to interview d1 and d2. So, h1 should be the first choice of d1 to have strong ladder
property.
d1 d2
h1
h2
1 1
2
d1 d2
h1
h2
1 n1
1 n1 should be equal to 1
Now we have to find the university who will interview d2 and d3. Note that, d2
can be matched with h1. In this case no value of information in (d2, d3) interview
for anyone. If h1 will not match with d2, h2 will match with d2 if h2 does not reject
d2. If he rejects it means d2 is negative and again there is no value of information
in (d2, d3) interview for anyone but h2. If h2 is matched with d2 again no value
of information in (d2, d3) interview for anyone. That means, the only one who has
value of information on (d2, d3) interview is h2.
d1 d2 d3
h1
h2
1 1
2 n2
First, note that h1 will get either d1 or d2 in the second stage. So, at most two
university, except h1, can reject d3 one to have either d1 or d2, one to have d4 if she is
better than d3. Therefore, n2 ≤ 3. If n2 = 3, d3 can propose to h2, if one university
rejected d3 to have d4 and one university rejected d3 to have d1 or d2. This means d2
has already proposed to someone and will not be rejected. That is to say interview
with d2 and d3 is meaningless. If n2 = 2, d3 proposes h2 if d31 rejects d3. This can
be only if d31 rejects d3 either, to have d4 which means d3 cannot be better than d2
and it is meaningless for h2 to interview with d2, d3 pair, or to have d1 which means
h1 got d2 which implies again it is not individually rational to interview d2, d3 pair.
Hence, we conclude n2 = 1.
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s1 s2 s3
u1
u2
u3
1 1
2 1
2 n3
The same procedure, goes on for all hi and completes the proof.
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